



The Private Equity Negotiation Myth 
William W. Clayton† 
Private equity fund agreements have been criticized for failing to protect 
investors from exploitation by fund managers. One defense frequently used by 
the industry has been to invoke what I call the private equity negotiation myth, 
which claims that because fund agreements are highly negotiated, substantive 
concerns about their terms are unwarranted. This myth assumes that large 
investors will use their bargaining power to demand strong fund agreement 
protections for all of the investors in a fund. 
This Article questions the private equity negotiation myth. First, I show 
that large investors’ incentives to negotiate fund agreements can often be 
weaker than the myth suggests. Because large private equity fund investors are 
commonly able to negotiate for individualized benefits outside of fund 
agreements, they have strong incentives to use their bargaining power to 
maximize individualized benefits before negotiating for better fund-wide 
protections. Individualized benefits thus can dampen the extent to which fund 
agreements are actually negotiated. Second, I show that large investors cannot 
always be expected to “vote with their feet,” either, by avoiding funds with 
suboptimal protections. When large investors have bargaining power, it makes 
them less sensitive to the quality of fund agreement terms because they can 
negotiate for individualized benefits that offset the harm caused by weak 
protections. As a result, the marginal investors in private equity funds—those 
whose preferences have the greatest influence on the quality of fund terms—
may sometimes be ones that lack bargaining power rather than the ones that 
have it. Lastly, some of the largest institutional investors in private equity funds 
may suffer from internal agency problems that reduce their incentives to 
demand strong protections.  
The private equity negotiation myth thus encourages policymakers to 
make policy decisions based on incomplete information in this $5 trillion 
industry. By challenging the myth and showing the true incentives associated 
with bargaining power in private equity funds, this Article contributes to 
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important and timely policy discussions at both the state and federal levels on 
the regulation of private investments. 
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Introduction 
Strong criticisms have been levied against private equity fund agreements 
in recent years. Fund agreements have been accused of enabling managers to 
charge exorbitant fees,1 encouraging managers to engage in excessive risk-
taking,2 allowing managers to operate behind a veil of secrecy,3 and eliminating 
negative consequences for managers’ bad behavior,4 among other critiques. 
One commentator has accused fund agreements of being so deficient that they 
create an “incubator for agency costs.”5 Given the vast size of the private equity 
market,6 and the heavy investment by public institutions in private equity 
funds,7 these criticisms have raised alarm. 
In response, one defense frequently used by the private equity industry has 
been to invoke what I call the private equity negotiation myth.8 The myth is 
simple. It claims that large investors in private equity funds use their bargaining 
power to negotiate for robust protections in fund agreements that benefit all 
investors in a fund. Because fund agreements are highly negotiated, so the myth 
goes, concerns about the substantive quality of their terms must be 
unwarranted.9 
This defense has strong surface-level appeal. If fund agreements really are 
heavily negotiated by large investors, it would create a presumption that the 
terms in them are not deficient, despite what critics say. Classical contract 
theory holds that unrestricted freedom of contract between parties that possess 
equal bargaining power, skill, and knowledge of relevant market conditions 
enhances individual welfare and promotes an efficient allocation of resources.10 
 
1. See infra note 77 and accompanying text. 
2. See infra note 54 and accompanying text. 
3. See infra notes 76-79 and accompanying text. 
4. See infra notes 87-90 and accompanying text. 
5. James C. Spindler, How Private Is Private Equity, and at What Cost?, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 
311, 333 (2009) (“One could view the typical private-equity setup as creating almost an incubator for 
agency costs, an incredibly hospitable environment for opportunistic managerial behavior.”). 
6. See The Rise and Rise of Private Equity, MCKINSEY & COMPANY (Feb. 2018), 
https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/private-equity-and-principal-investors/our-insights/the-rise-and-
rise-of-private-equity [https://perma.cc/6XRJ-KQ9J] (“Private markets’ assets under management 
(AUM), which include committed capital, dry powder, and asset appreciation, surpassed $5 trillion in 
2017, up 8 percent year on year.”). 
7. Public pension plans are by far the largest investor type in private equity funds, representing 
35% of all investment. See PREQIN, GLOBAL PRIVATE EQUITY & VENTURE CAPITAL REPORT 73 (2018); 
see also Andrew J. Bowden, Dir., Office of Compliance Inspections & Examinations, U.S. Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n, Address at the Private Equity International Private Fund Compliance Forum: Spreading 
Sunshine in Private Equity (May 6, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2014--
spch05062014ab.html [https://perma.cc/QK8R-XKV8] (noting that misconduct in the private equity 
industry “adversely affects the retirement savings of teachers, firemen, police officers, and other workers 
across the U.S.”). 
8. See infra note 91 and accompanying text. 
9. See infra Part II. 
10. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 72 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1981) 
(“Bargains are widely believed to be beneficial to the community in the provision of opportunities for 
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The benefits of fund agreement negotiations thus would be enjoyed by all 
investors in private equity funds, not just the large ones. 
Closer examination, however, reveals that large investors cannot simply 
be relied on to play this role. Unlike in a corporate setting,11 large investors in 
private equity funds commonly use their bargaining power to negotiate for 
individualized benefits outside of fund agreements, where the benefit of the 
bargain is not shared with other investors in the fund. These individualized 
benefits, which can include fee discounts and rights to participate in co-
investments alongside the fund (among others),12 fundamentally alter large 
investors’ incentives. When individualized benefits are common, they can 
diminish large investors’ incentives to demand strong protections in fund 
agreements in two ways. 
First, individualized benefits can weaken large investors’ incentives to 
negotiate fund agreements. In general, the more that an investor can use its 
bargaining power to negotiate for individualized benefits before it negotiates 
for things that will benefit all investors in the fund (like fund agreement 
protections), it will be a more “efficient” use of that investor’s bargaining 
power.13 This does not eliminate the negotiation of fund agreements, but, when 
individualized benefits are common, it is likely to have a dampening effect on 
the extent to which fund agreements are negotiated. 
Second, individualized benefits can also weaken large investors’ 
incentives to “vote with their feet” by refusing to invest in funds that have 
suboptimal protections. In the absence of negotiation, the quality of a fund 
agreement’s terms will be shaped by the preferences of the “marginal” 
investors in that market,14 which are the investors that will stop investing when 
the quality of the fund agreement terms starts to decline.15 This Article shows 
that bargaining power can actually make large investors less sensitive to the 
 
freedom of individual action and exercise of judgment and as a means by which productive energy and 
product are apportioned in the economy. The enforcement of bargains rests in part on the common belief 
that enforcement enhances that utility.”). 
11. One of the core principles of corporate law is that shareholders holding the same class of 
shares should be treated similarly. See REINIER H. KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE 
LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 96 (2d ed. 2009) (stating that the equal treatment 
of shareholders in the same class is a fundamental norm of corporate law); Victor Brudney, Equal 
Treatment of Shareholders in Corporate Distributions and Reorganizations, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1072, 
1074 (1983) (stating that all shares of common stock are to be treated as “homogeneous claims on 
enterprise wealth” in a public corporation). 
12. See infra Section III.D for a discussion of the various forms that these individualized 
benefits can take. 
13.  An “efficient” use of bargaining power in this context is one that achieves the greatest 
personal benefit possible in return for the investor’s bargaining power. See infra Section III.A.2. 
14. This assumes a competitive market where buyers have alternative options. See G. Marcus 
Cole, Rational Consumer Ignorance, 11 J.L. ECON & POL’Y 413, 414 (2015) (“[N]on-price terms, like 
price terms, are ‘policed’ in competitive markets by the marginal consumer for each term.”). 
15. See id. at 422 (“[T]he marginal consumer, by definition, is the party for whom a particular 
term means the most. . . . The marginal consumer is someone who cares so much about that particular 
term, that she has educated herself, researched the product terms, and its closest substitutes along the 
margin of that all-important dimension—whatever it happens to be.”). 
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quality of fund agreement terms because it enables them to negotiate for 
individualized benefits that offset the harm caused by weak fund agreement 
protections. This means that large investors may sometimes be willing to invest 
in funds that they would otherwise find unacceptable if they lacked bargaining 
power.16 As a result, large investors with bargaining power may not always be 
the marginal investors—those whose preferences have the greatest influence on 
the quality of fund terms—in the private equity funds that they invest in.17 
The incentives described above will apply when large investors are acting 
rationally to maximize returns for their beneficiaries. But this may not always 
be the case. The largest investors in private equity funds are public pension 
plans, whose staff members have sometimes been shown to suffer from agency 
problems.18 These agency problems can dampen their incentive to demand 
strong protections, even when doing so would be beneficial for plan 
beneficiaries.19 
Challenging the private equity negotiation myth is important for a few 
reasons. Most fundamentally, it shows that the criticisms of fund agreements 
raised in recent years cannot be dismissed by simply invoking negotiation. At 
its core, the private equity negotiation myth is a process-based response to 
substantive criticisms. It argues that because the process by which fund 
agreement terms are created is sound, substantive scrutiny of those terms is 
unwarranted and unnecessary. This Article shows that policymakers should not 
simply take the negotiation myth at face value. Just because there are large 
investors in the industry that have bargaining power, it cannot automatically be 
assumed that fund agreements will always have robust protections for all 
investors in them.20 
This Article also contributes to broader policy discussions at both the state 
and federal levels. At the state level, this analysis advances the literature on the 
controversial practice of waiving fiduciary duties in non-corporate entities like 
 
16. See infra Section III.B.2 for an illustrative example. 
17. See infra Section III.B.2. 
18. See Josef Lakonishok, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, The Structure and 
Performance of the Money Management Industry, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, 
MICROECONOMICS 339 (Clifford Winston ed., 1992) (finding significant underperformance by pension 
plans attributable to agency problems, including actions taken by pension employees to shift 
responsibility for poor performance); Paul Gompers & Josh Lerner, The Use of Covenants: An 
Empirical Analysis of Venture Partnership Agreements, 39 J.L. & ECON. 463 (1996) (finding that 
institutional investor employees show a willingness to allow value to be transferred to fund managers in 
complex ways that are difficult for outsiders and superiors to detect, but not in ways that can be more 
easily observed and scrutinized); George Pennacchi & Mahdi Rastad, Portfolio Allocation for Public 
Pension Plans, 10 J. PENSION ECON. & FIN. 221 (2011) (finding that public pension plans tend to 
allocate assets based on the performance of peer pension funds rather than based on hedging the plan’s 
liabilities due to staff career concerns). 
19. See infra Section III.C. 
20. To be clear, I am not claiming that a legitimate process-based defense does not exist for 
private equity fund agreements. For example, if all investors in the private equity market are sufficiently 
sophisticated to analyze fund agreements and search the market for alternatives, then lack of negotiation 
may not be problematic at all. This Article focuses on the negotiation-based defense raised by the 
industry in recent years and does not examine the legitimacy of alternative defenses. 
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limited partnerships and limited liability companies. It builds on commentary 
by Leo Strine, Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, and Travis Laster, 
Vice Chancellor of the Delaware Chancery Court, questioning the policy of 
allowing alternative entity managers to waive their fiduciary duties, and it also 
fills important gaps in that analysis in the context of private equity funds.21 
At the federal level, this Article’s analysis lends important insights to 
current policy initiatives aimed at responding to the dramatic rise of private 
markets in recent years.22 The SEC recently launched a comprehensive re-
examination of the federal securities laws that regulate investor access to 
private funds,23 with an eye toward opening up more opportunities for retail 
investors to gain exposure to private investments.24 In response to concerns 
about investor safety, one influential research organization has argued that 
retail investors could rely on large institutional investors to demand strong 
protections on their behalf if they were granted access to private equity funds.25 
This Article shows why policymakers should view any such claims skeptically. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I discusses conflicts of interest that 
arise in private equity funds and the various forms of protection against these 
conflicts commonly used in private equity funds. Part II summarizes some of 
the most pointed criticisms of private equity fund agreements in recent years 
and shows how the industry has responded by raising the private equity 
negotiation myth in its defense. Part III challenges the myth by arguing that 
 
21. See Leo E. Strine, Jr. & J. Travis Laster, The Siren Song of Unlimited Contractual 
Freedom, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PARTNERSHIPS, LLCS AND ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATIONS 11 (Robert W. Hillman & Mark J. Loewenstein eds., 2015). 
22. See infra Section IV.B. The rise of private markets has been attended by a related decline 
in U.S. public markets. See Maureen Farrell, America’s Roster of Public Companies Is Shrinking Before 
Our Eyes, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 6, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/americas-roster-of-public-
companies-is-shrinking-before-our-eyes-1483545879 [https://perma.cc/ELA4-YN6A] (“Since the 
financial crisis, the equity market has become bifurcated, with a private option available to select 
investors and a public one that is more of a last resort for companies.”); Jonathan Macey, Opinion, As 
IPOs Decline, the Market Is Becoming More Elitist, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2017) 
https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-macey-ipo-democracy-20170110-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/66K2-4A9D] (“It’s not an exaggeration to say that the IPO market is in the beginning 
of a death spiral as observers assume that any company that resorts to raising money in an IPO must 
already have been rejected by the more sophisticated investors in the private capital markets.”). 
23. See SEC, Concept Release on Harmonization of Securities Offering Exemptions (June 18, 
2019), https://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/2019/33-10649.pdf [https://perma.cc/N4V3-WEGG]. 
24. See DAVIS POLK, PRIVATE EQUITY REGULATORY UPDATE 3 (July 31, 2019), 
https://www.davispolk.com/files/2019-07-31_private_equity_regulatory_update_july_2019.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/K8BH-LZ48] (“[T]here are [Concept Release] sections that focus on opening up 
investments in private companies and private funds to retail investors. One of the major themes of the 
Concept Release is that the SEC has recognized that retail investors’ inability to participate in private 
opportunities, either directly or through investment funds, may be disadvantaging them economically.”). 
25. See COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, EXPANDING OPPORTUNITIES FOR 
INVESTORS AND RETIREES: PRIVATE EQUITY 36 (Nov. 2018), https://www.capmktsreg.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/10/Private-Equity-Report-FINAL-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/4SR9-KVQN] 
(“Congress could establish or empower the SEC to establish any . . . protections for retail investors that 
they deem necessary. For example, . . . Congress or the SEC could only permit a private equity fund to 
accept retail investors if the assets managed by the affiliated manager include a material institutional 
component (e.g., more than 50%). Such a requirement would enable retail investors to leverage the 
demands of institutional investors.”). 
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large investors cannot be counted on to demand strong protections in fund 
agreements through negotiation or by “voting with their feet.” It also provides a 
concise description of the various forms of individualized benefits that 
investors can seek to negotiate for in private equity funds. Part IV concludes 
with a discussion of policy implications. 
I. Conflicts of Interest in Private Equity Funds 
A. Basic Conflicts of Interest 
Private equity managers26 invest other people’s money for a fee. They 
raise money by pooling the capital of their various investors into a single 
vehicle called a fund. Fund investors generally commit different levels of 
capital to the fund—some commit very large amounts while others commit 
much smaller amounts. These “pooled” funds are typically organized as limited 
partnerships27 and governed by a limited partnership agreement (an “LPA”), a 
document that is collectively negotiated between the manager and the fund’s 
investors and sets forth the terms of the fund. Private equity LPAs are long and 
complicated agreements, typically over 100 pages long.28 By and large, the 
industry is very lightly regulated.29 
 
 
26. To avoid unnecessary complexity, I will use the term “manager” through most of this 
Article, even in cases where other terms (like “sponsor” or “adviser” or “general partner”) may be more 
technically correct. Any technical distinctions will not be important for purposes of this Article. I will 
also generally use the term “investor” throughout this Article, even in cases where the term “limited 
partner” might be more technically correct, for similar reasons. 
27. Because funds are usually structured as limited partnerships, the limited partnership 
architecture applies to these vehicles. Accordingly, investors are passive “limited partners,” and the 
manager acts through a “general partner” that has broad authority to control the fund. 
28. See Marco Da Rin & Ludovic Phalippou, The Importance of Size in Private Equity: 
Evidence from a Survey of Limited Partners, 31 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 64, 69 (2016) (“LPAs are 
technical and lengthy documents, typically over 100 pages.”). 
29. See Douglas Cumming & Sofia Johan, Regulatory Harmonization and the Development of 
Private Equity Markets, 31 J. BANKING & FIN. 3218, 3219 (2007) (“The dearth or lack of regulations in 
private equity to which we refer is related to the fact that investors in private equity funds are 
institutional investors and high net worth individuals (not the so-called unsophisticated retail investors) 
and therefore these funds do not receive the same degree of scrutiny as other types of retail based funds, 
such as mutual funds.”). 
  




Figure A. Illustrative Private Equity Fund 
 
Once a fund is formed, a manager has an “investment period”—typically 
three to five years30—during which the fund is free to make investments. These 
investments are known as “portfolio companies,” and a manager’s objective is 
to buy companies that are undervalued or that would benefit from changes to 
strategy or management. During the investment period, investors are 
contractually obligated to contribute capital to the fund each time the manager 
makes a “capital call” so the fund can make investments and pay the fund’s 
fees and other expenses. Managers typically have extremely broad discretion to 
select investments, and investors generally have very few rights to influence the 
fund’s activities.31 
After a number of years, the manager seeks to sell the fund’s portfolio 
companies or take them public through initial public offerings, hoping to make 
profits upon the disposition. Each fund has a stipulated end date (typically 
around ten years after the date of the fund’s closing)32 by which the manager 
 
30. See STEPHANIE BRESLOW & PHYLLIS SCHWARTZ, PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS: FORMATION 
AND OPERATION § 2:4.2 (Carol Benedicto ed., Practising Law Inst. 2015) (“The appropriate length of 
the commitment period will vary depending on the investment strategy of the fund, with a time period of 
three to five years being typical for many strategies.”). 
31. For this reason, traditional private equity funds are commonly called “blind pools” because 
investors are signing up to invest in them without any knowledge of, or control over, the investments 
that will be made by the manager. See Spindler, supra note 5, at 328-29 (“While the [LPA] will usually 
impose strict obligations upon the limited partner to provide capital to the partnership, the limited 
partner has very little control over what the capital is used for.”). 
32. See Ronald W. Masulis & Randall S. Thomas, Does Private Equity Create Wealth? The 
Effects of Private Equity and Derivatives on Corporate Governance, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 219, 222 (2009) 
(noting that private equity funds are typically established for ten-year terms). 
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must dispose of any remaining assets and distribute the proceeds to the fund’s 
investors.33 
Conflicts of interest in private equity funds stem from the separation of 
ownership and control in the private equity fund structure.34 For example, 
private equity managers may be incentivized to invest less time and effort than 
they would if they were managing their own money, or they may seek to enrich 
themselves at the expense of their investors. Manager self-dealing could take 
the form of secretly charging excessive fees and expenses or of keeping the 
best investment opportunities for personal investment rather than allocating 
them to the fund, among any number of others.35 
B. Protections Against Conflicts 
Legal scholars and financial economists have theorized about the ways in 
which private equity investors can defend against agency conflicts in the 
absence of mandatory legal protections.36 The combination of contractual 
protections, paired with a manager’s reputational incentives, are generally seen 
as the most important tools. Each is considered below. 
Before committing to invest in a fund, investors have an opportunity to 
review the LPA governing the terms of the fund. LPAs contain a number of 
provisions that are designed to protect investors from conflicts with the fund 
manager.37 One way that LPAs seek to limit these conflicts is through the 
 
33. Often, the life of a fund can be extended for successive one- or two-year periods to 
liquidate and wind up investments. 
34. See generally ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION 
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1933); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: 
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976) 
(describing the relationship between investor and manager as one “under which one or more persons 
(the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which 
involves delegating some decision-making authority to the agent”). 
35. See infra Section II.A for a discussion of some of the conflicts that have been criticized in 
private equity funds. 
36. See, e.g., PAUL GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE 158 (2d ed. 
2004); Vladimir A. Atanasov, Vladimir I. Ivanov & Kate Litvak, Does Reputation Limit Opportunistic 
Behavior in the VC Industry? Evidence from Litigation Against VCs, 67 J. FIN. 2215 (2012); Victor 
Fleischer, The Missing Preferred Return, 31 J. CORP. L. 77, 80 (2005); Lee Harris, A Critical Theory of 
Private Equity, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 259, 285 (2010); Steve Kaplan & Antoinette Schoar, Private Equity 
Performance: Returns, Persistence and Capital Flows, 60 J. FIN. 1791, 1791 (2005) (finding that better 
performing managers are more likely to raise successor funds and larger funds); Kate Litvak, Monte 
Carlo Simulation of Contractual Provisions: An Application to Default Provisions in Venture Capital 
Limited Partnership Agreements, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1495, 1498 (2013); Kate Litvak, Venture Capital 
Limited Partnership Agreements: Understanding Compensation Arrangements, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 161, 
162 (2009); Andrew Metrick & Ayako Yasuda, The Economics of Private Equity Funds, 23 REV. FIN. 
STUD. 2303 (2010); John Morley, The Separation of Funds and Managers: A Theory of Investment Fund 
Structure and Regulation, 123 YALE L.J. 1228, 1254-55 (2014); Larry E. Ribstein, Partnership 
Governance of Large Firms, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 289, 298-99 (2009); William A. Sahlman, The Structure 
and Governance of Venture-Capital Organizations, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 473, 489-516 (1990); Spindler, 
supra note 5, at 332. 
37. See David T. Robinson & Berk A. Sensoy, Do Private Equity Fund Managers Earn Their 
Fees? Compensation, Ownership and Cash Flow Performance, 26 REV. FIN. STUD. 2760, 2760 (2013) 
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manager’s compensation arrangements. In addition to “management fees,” 
which are calculated as an annual percentage of the investor’s total investment 
in the fund,38 private equity managers typically receive a percentage interest in 
the profits of the fund called a “carried interest,”39 which generally results in 
them receiving higher compensation as the profitability of the fund increases. 
Managers are also generally required to invest a certain amount of their own 
money directly in the fund itself alongside the pooled fund investors. 
Depending on how the manager’s carried interest and commitment to invest in 
the fund are structured in the LPA, they can shape the manager’s incentives in 
various ways and afford greater or lesser protection to investors. 
LPAs also contain various non-economic provisions designed to address 
agency conflicts. For example, investors are sometimes granted the right to 
consent to certain transactions when the manager’s interest is conflicted, or to 
dissolve the fund if the manager engages in certain forms of misconduct.40 
LPAs also sometimes include requirements that the manager’s key employees 
dedicate a certain percentage of their time to working for the fund.41 Terms 
designed to limit risk-taking by the manager—such as restrictions on borrowing 
and requirements for diversification of investments—can also be included.42 
Funds also commonly establish “advisory boards” consisting of the fund’s 
largest investors, which are sometimes given limited rights to consult with the 
manager or consent to certain types of transactions.43 
In addition to contractual protections, agency conflicts in funds are limited 
by managers’ incentive to maintain a good reputation. Because private equity 
funds have limited lives,44 private equity managers must raise funds on a serial 
basis if they desire to remain in business. Managers commonly start raising a 
 
(“In private equity, the agency relationship between fund managers (the general partners, or GPs) and 
investors (the limited partners, or LPs) is governed by a management contract that is signed at the 
inception of the fund.”). 
38. See BRESLOW & SCHWARTZ, supra note 30, § 2:8.2[B][1] (“The market rate for 
management fees of private equity funds is approximately 1.5%-2% of the fund’s aggregate capital 
commitments during the fund’s investment period.”). 
39. Historically, the conventional carried interest percentage has been between 15-20% of the 
fund’s profits over a “hurdle” rate of 5-12%. See JAMES M. SCHELL ET AL., PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS: 
BUSINESS STRUCTURE AND OPERATIONS § 2.03[2] (2018) (“Fixed rate preferred returns commonly 
range from 5% to 12%.”). 
40. See id. § 11.12[1]. 
41. See id. § 11.04[6] (“[A] ‘key person provision’ generally refers to a contractual provision 
that grants various rights and remedies to the investors upon the departure or disabling conduct of a 
specified number of ‘key persons.’ The ‘key persons’ are typically defined in the partnership agreement 
as the Principals or senior managers of the Fund.”). 
42. See id. § 11.07[2][b] (“In the case of most private equity funds, a policy concerning 
diversification is imposed as a contractual requirement. In many cases, a private equity fund will 
generally not be allowed to invest more than 20% to 25% of its total capital commitments in the 
securities of any single portfolio company.”). 
43. See id. § 11.07[8] (“From the Limited Partners’ perspective, an Advisory Board represents 
a mechanism for a limited degree of oversight in areas where the interests of the General Partner may 
not be fully aligned with those of the Limited Partners.”). 
44. See Masulis & Thomas, supra note 32, at 222 (noting that private equity funds are 
typically established for ten-year terms). 
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new fund for a given strategy every three to five years, launching a new fund 
each time the investment period of a prior fund draws to a close. 
If a manager wants to raise funds in the future, it has an incentive to 
achieve a successful “track record” of investment returns in its current fund 
because investors want to see evidence of the manager’s capabilities before 
they commit their money.45 A manager’s history of past performance is 
typically provided to investors in the marketing materials that they distribute to 
prospective investors when they raise a fund. 
Managers are also subject to fiduciary duties under state limited 
partnership law46 and under the federal Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (the 
“Advisers Act”).47 However, in Delaware, the state in which most private 
equity fund limited partnerships are formed,48 fiduciary duties can be modified, 
or even waived entirely, by an LPA’s terms,49 and under the Advisers Act, 
fiduciary duties can largely be satisfied by disclosure of conflicts and other 
risks.50 The world of private equity funds is thus highly contractual, and neither 
 
45. See Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the American 
Experience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1067, 1089-90 (2003) (“A [manager’s] track record . . . is the [manager’s] 
principal tool for persuading investors to invest in successor funds.”); see also PREQIN, KEY DUE 
DILIGENCE CONSIDERATIONS FOR PRIVATE EQUITY INVESTORS (2014), 
https://docs.preqin.com/reports/Preqin-Special-Report-Due-Diligence-Private-Equity-Investors-Jul-
14.pdf [https://perma.cc/RFA6-ZRXQ] (reporting the results of a survey showing that both placement 
agents and investment consultants believe the track record of the investment team is the most important 
indicator that a fund will outperform peer funds); Curtis J. Milhaupt, The Market for Innovation in the 
United States and Japan: Venture Capital and the Comparative Corporate Governance Debate, 91 NW. 
U. L. REV. 865, 886 (1997) (“[T]he short life of limited partnerships virtually guarantees that the venture 
capitalists will undergo a ‘periodic performance review’ at the hands of their current investors who are, 
inevitably, potential future investors as well.”). 
46. These include a duty of loyalty, which, among other things, requires that the general 
partner refrain from dealing with the partnership on behalf of a party that has an adverse interest and 
from competing with the partnership, and a duty of care. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 15-404(b), 
(c) (2018); REVISED UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 403(b) (1976); UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 408 (1916). 
47. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 196 (1963) (“The Investment 
Advisers Act of 1940 thus reflects a congressional recognition ‘of the delicate fiduciary nature of an 
investment advisory relationship,’ as well as a congressional intent to eliminate, or at least to expose, all 
conflicts of interest which might incline an investment adviser . . . to render advice which was not 
disinterested.”). 
48. See Private Equity (Fund Formation), GETTING THE DEAL THROUGH (Mar. 2019), 
https://gettingthedealthrough.com/area/28/jurisdiction/23/private-equity-fund-formation-2019-united-
states [https://perma.cc/33XJ-VHSR] (“In the United States, private equity funds are typically formed as 
limited partnerships in the State of Delaware, pursuant to the Delaware Revised Uniform Limited 
Partnership Act (DRULPA).”); Robert Schwartz, Delaware as a Location for Private Funds: The Why 
and the What, WORLD SEC. L. REP. (BNA) (Aug. 10, 2012). 
49. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-1101(d) (2018) (“To the extent that, at law or in 
equity, a partner or other person has duties (including fiduciary duties) to a limited partnership or to 
another partner or to another person that is a party to or is otherwise bound by a partnership agreement, 
the partner’s or other person’s duties may be expanded or restricted or eliminated by provisions in the 
partnership agreement; provided that the partnership agreement may not eliminate the implied 
contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing.”). Note, however, that the more limited implied 
contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot be waived under Section 18-1101(c) of the 
Delaware Limited Liability Company Act. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c) (2018). 
50. See Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. at 196 (citing United States v. Miss. Valley 
Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520 (1961)) (holding that investors must “be permitted to evaluate overlapping 
motivations, through appropriate disclosure, in deciding whether an adviser is serving ‘two masters’ or 
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state nor federal law provide investors with meaningful back-up protection if 
the combination of LPA-based protections and reputation-based protections is 
deficient. 
II. The Private Equity Negotiation Myth 
LPAs are held up as one of the primary sources of investor protection 
against managerial exploitation in private equity funds, but they have been 
criticized by many in recent years. One response to this criticism has been for 
the industry to invoke what I call the private equity negotiation myth as a 
defense.51 Because LPAs are heavily negotiated by large investors, so the 
argument goes, there is no basis for outside observers to criticize the substance 
of these agreements. 
A. Critiques of Private Equity LPAs 
1. Scholarly Critiques 
Scholars have accused LPAs of being deficient in a number of ways over 
the years.52 One line of criticism argues that the compensation arrangements set 
forth in LPAs, which are supposed to align managers’ interests with their 
investors’ interests,53 actually create serious conflicts of interest. Scholars have 
criticized carried interest compensation for encouraging excessive risk-taking 
by managers in their investment decisions,54 creating a moral hazard problem 
because managers enjoy the upside of strong performance without downside 
 
only one, ‘especially . . . if one of the masters happens to be economic self-interest’”); Andrew 
Ceresney, Dir., Div. of Enforcement, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Securities Enforcement Forum West 
2016 Keynote Address: Private Equity Enforcement (Mar. 12, 2016), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/private-equity-enforcement.html [https://perma.cc/47JT-FLA7] 
(indicating that managers must “disclose sufficiently specific facts such that the client is able to 
understand the [manager’s] conflicts of interest and business practices, and can give informed consent to 
such conflicts or practices”). As a result, if a manager has disclosed certain risks and investors have not 
negotiated for contractual protections against those risks, the investors will be exposed to those risks 
without any protection from federal fiduciary duties. 
51. See infra note 91 and accompanying text. 
52. See, e.g., Robinson & Sensoy, supra note 37, at 2761 (“[T]he typical private equity 
contract allows GPs to earn excessive compensation and does too little to discipline GPs or to provide 
them with incentives to maximize LP returns.”). 
53. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
54. See, e.g., Gilson, supra note 45, at 1089 (“While aligning the interests of the GP and the 
investors, the intensity of the GP’s compensation incentive in turn creates a different agency cost. The 
GP’s carried interest has option-like characteristics, which may cause it to prefer investments of greater 
risk than the investors. This is especially true with respect to the fund’s later investments if the early 
ones have done poorly. In that circumstance, the GP actually may be best served by making negative net 
present value investments if the investments are sufficiently risky.”); Harris, supra note 36, at 285 (“One 
of the problems of incentive compensation provisions . . . is that the compensation structure may 
encourage a manager to make overly risky investment decisions . . . .”). 
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risk.55 Carried interest has also been criticized for distorting managers’ 
decision-making in other ways, including giving them an incentive to shorten 
their investment horizons and time cash flows in ways that will increase 
incentive fees.56 Separately, scholars have also argued that the carried interest 
formulations in LPAs are unnecessarily and overly complex, making it harder 
for investors to understand exactly how much they are obligated to pay.57 
One of the most controversial critiques of LPAs in recent years has to do 
with portfolio company fees charged by private equity fund managers. These 
fees are not paid directly by investors. Instead, they are paid by the portfolio 
companies owned by the fund, as illustrated in Figure B. These fees have often 
taken the form of “monitoring” fees or “consulting” fees—the idea is that the 
portfolio companies pay managers for “services” that the managers provide to 
the portfolio companies. However, because portfolio companies are ultimately 
controlled by a fund’s manager (because the manager controls the fund that 
owns the portfolio company), the timing and amount of these payments have 
historically been controlled by the manager. Skeptical of the value actually 




55. See, e.g., William Magnuson, The Public Cost of Private Equity, 102 MINN. L. REV. 1847, 
1872 (2018) (“The carried interest element of private equity compensation creates a moral hazard 
problem in the private equity industry that in many ways mirrors the critiques levied against the banking 
industry after the financial crisis of 2008-2009.”). 
56. See Ludovic Phalippou, Beware of Venturing into Private Equity, 23 J. ECON. PERSPS. 
147, 162 (2009) (“To isolate further potential conflicts between the managers of private equity buyout 
funds and their outside investors, I discuss a few features of buyout contracts that exacerbate conflicts of 
interest, rather than mitigate them. First, managers have an incentive to time cash flows in a way that 
will increase incentive fees. Second, certain contracts provide steep incentives for shortening investment 
horizons. Third, transaction fees may distort choices of buyout firms in terms of leverage, size of 
investment, and number of changes in capital structure.”). 
57. See, e.g., Peter Morris & Ludovic Phalippou, A New Approach to Regulating Private 
Equity, 12 J. CORP. L. STUD. 59 (2012) (positing that complexity in an LPA’s carried interest provision 
can benefit managers by making it harder for investors to understand it). 
58. EILEEN APPELBAUM & ROSEMARY BATT, CTR. FOR ECON. & POLICY RESEARCH, FEES, 
FEES AND MORE FEES: HOW PRIVATE EQUITY ABUSES ITS LIMITED PARTNERS AND U.S. TAXPAYERS 12 
(May 2016), http://cepr.net/images/stories/reports/private-equity-fees-2016-05.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HSE2-2J4Z]. 
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Figure B. Portfolio Company Fees 
 
The payment of portfolio company fees has historically been authorized 
by language in LPAs that permits managers to charge them in a general sense 
but otherwise provides little specificity about the timing and nature of these 
fees.59 Scholars have raised concerns that LPAs thus effectively gave managers 
freedom to charge an unspecified amount in fees in the future without obtaining 
investors’ specific consent to those fees.60 While many LPAs stipulate that all 
or a portion of these portfolio company fees will eventually be reimbursed to 
investors or offset fees that would otherwise be paid by investors,61 critics have 
argued that vague language in LPAs can lead to those rebates and offsets never 
being realized.62 
 
59. See id. at 1 (“[V]ague and misleading wording allows PE firms to take advantage of their 
asymmetric position of power vis-à-vis investors and the lack of transparency in their activities.”). 
60. See, e.g., Ludovic Phalippou, Christian Rauch & Marc Umber, Private Equity Portfolio 
Company Fees, 129 J. FIN. ECON. 559, 560 (2018) (“[Investors] do not agree on all fees ex ante and 
leave ex post discretion to [managers]. . . . The amount of fees charged to portfolio companies is not 
specified in the LPA; they are contracted upon in the Management Services Agreements which are 
signed by the [manager] and representatives of the company at the time of the transaction.”). 
61. This approach has become quite common in recent years. See Graeme Kerr, LPs Demand 
More Granularity, PRIV. FUNDS MGMT., Nov. 2018, https://www.pepperlaw.com/resource/33536/14G0 
[https://perma.cc/FYZ8-JJBA] (showing that 47% of survey respondents offset 100% of portfolio 
company monitoring fees against management fees, with 35% of survey respondents offsetting between 
80-100% of portfolio company monitoring fees against management fees). 
62. See APPELBAUM & BATT, supra note 58, at 10-11 (“Many current Limited Partnership 
Agreements stipulate that a portion of the transaction and monitoring fees charged to portfolio 
companies will be rebated to the PE fund’s limited partners. But vague and confusing wording in the 
LPAs has meant that too often . . . these investors have not received the fee income that is owed them; 
instead, it has been pocketed by the PE firm. Even when LPs are reimbursed out of these fees, the LP 
can only receive the amount it has paid in management fees. Monitoring fees in excess of those 
payments are retained solely by the PE firm.”). 
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Scholars have also criticized LPAs for failing to require that managers 
provide sufficiently robust information disclosures to their investors.63 
Compared to shareholders in publicly traded companies, private equity funds 
have been accused of giving investors only “barebones” information about the 
fund, and of subjecting investors’ information rights to numerous caveats and 
conditions that benefit managers and keep investors in the dark.64 Weak LPAs 
have thus, according to critics, led to private equity fund managers being 
among the least transparent actors in the financial marketplace.65 
When LPAs do not require robust disclosure, it can have compounding 
effects.66 Scholars have argued that weak disclosure diminishes the 
effectiveness of reputation67 as a source of protection against exploitation.68 In 
order for investors to assess a manager’s reputation, they need information 
about the manager’s history and past performance in prior funds. However, if 
information about a manager’s bad acts is never disclosed, the manager cannot 
be held accountable for those acts. The effectiveness of reputation will be 
particularly diminished if, as some scholars have argued, weak disclosure 
obligations enable managers to overstate the performance of their current and 
prior funds.69 
The critiques described above, if valid, are exacerbated by the fact that 
LPAs have long granted weak control rights and exit rights to private equity 
fund investors. Accordingly, if incentive compensation and reputation really do 
provide insufficient protection, investors will have limited options for taking 
matters into their own hands. Some scholars have advocated for stronger 
control rights.70 
 
63. See id. at 7 (“The reporting requirements for private equity [managers] under Dodd Frank 
are modest compared with what publicly traded companies, mutual funds, and other investment funds 
must disclose to the SEC.”); Spindler, supra note 5, at 325-28 (“[O]nce the investment decision has been 
made, limited partners are largely in the dark. . . . [T]he information that limited partners receive is 
somewhat useful in terms of keeping in check gross malfeasance by the general partners but not useful 
in terms of knowing what their investments are likely to be worth at any point in time or whether the 
general partners are doing a good job.”). 
64. See Magnuson, supra note 55, at 1882 (“[E]ven the limited information disclosures that 
private equity investors are entitled to come saddled with myriad caveats and carve outs.”). 
65. See APPELBAUM & BATT, supra note 58, at 6 (“Private equity is among the least 
transparent financial actors in the economy.”). 
66. For example, it could mean that investors may never find out, even after the fact, how 
much a manager was paid in the form of portfolio company fees. 
67. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
68. See, e.g., Magnuson, supra note 55, at 1900 (“[R]eputation can only constrain a party’s 
behavior if the party believes that others will receive information about the party’s past behavior and 
base their decision making on that past behavior. In other words, reputation is only as good as the 
information that underlies it.”); Spindler, supra note 5, at 332 (“There is a tendency to overstate the 
salutary effect of reputation; from a theoretical perspective, the gradual learning that takes place through 
reputation is inefficient compared to more immediate revelation through greater transparency.”). 
69. See Magnuson, supra note 55, at 1900-01 (“In this atmosphere of extreme confidentiality, 
it is unsurprising that a number of studies have found that private equity firm disclosures systematically 
tend to overstate fund performance.”). 
70. See, e.g., Magnuson, supra note 55, at 1905 (“[P]rivate equity structures could be 
reformed to grant limited-partner investors greater governance rights, including voting, transfer, and 
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This leads to the last scholarly criticism of private equity fund LPAs that I 
will summarize here—the elimination of fiduciary duties under state limited 
partnership law.71 If all of the criticism described above applies to a fund and 
investors cannot rely on the LPA or the manager’s reputation for meaningful 
protection, then their protection of last resort would be the fiduciary duties that 
managers owe to their investors. Because funds are typically formed as limited 
partnerships, managers act as general partners of their funds, and are therefore 
subject to default fiduciary duties under state limited partnership law.72 
However, as noted above, private equity fund LPAs have long included 
provisions that explicitly modify, or even eliminate, these fiduciary duties 
altogether.73 Many scholars strongly oppose this highly contractarian approach 
to fiduciary duties and argue that fiduciary duties are necessary in light of other 
weaknesses in the private equity fund governance model.74 
The above criticism does not reflect the full universe of critical academic 
commentary on private equity fund LPAs, but it gives the reader a sense of 
some of the most important and frequently cited issues in this area. 
2. Journalistic Critiques 
The news media has also raised strong criticisms of private equity LPAs. 
Journalists have taken private equity LPAs to task for, among other things, 
failing to protect against managers engaging in conflicted investment 
 
information rights. Investors would not necessarily need broad governance rights in all of these areas in 
order to ensure that they are protected from misbehavior or shirking by private equity firms. Instead, 
greater governance rights in one area might obviate the need for greater governance rights in another.”); 
Spindler, supra note 5, at 314 (“[O]ne need not take a Bebchukian view of firm agency costs to believe 
that something more than zero shareholder empowerment is optimal. Some degree of privately 
negotiated disclosure and control would seem intuitively best.”). From a practical perspective, stronger 
exit rights would be difficult for managers to grant given the long-term holdings of private equity funds. 
71. As previously noted, managers also have fiduciary duties pursuant to the Advisers Act. A 
manager’s fiduciary duties under the Advisers Act cannot be waived entirely by contract, but they can 
be satisfied when the manager simply discloses the existence of the relevant conflicts of interest and 
risks. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
72. See, e.g., Paige Cap. Mgmt., LLC v. Lerner Master Fund, LLC, 2011 WL 3505355, at *31 
(Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 2011) (holding that “[a]s a matter of default law, [the] General Partner clearly owes 
fiduciary duties to the limited partners” unless the limited partnership agreement waives such duties). 
73. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
74. See, e.g., APPELBAUM & BATT, supra note 58, at 16 (“Analyses of Limited Partnership 
Agreements (LPAs) have also uncovered clauses that specifically allow private equity firms to waive 
their fiduciary responsibility towards their limited partners—leading to serious conflicts of interest and 
negative spillover effects for the beneficiaries of pension funds that invest in private equity.”); 
Magnuson, supra note 55, at 1877 (“The inability of private equity investors to participate in governance 
decisions might be less worrisome if they were protected by strong fiduciary duties. . . . But many 
limited partnership agreements require investors to waive any fiduciary duties that the private equity 
firm might otherwise have, thus depriving private equity investors of this judicial check on 
misbehavior.”). But see Larry E. Ribstein, Fiduciary Duties and Limited Partnership Agreements, 37 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 927, 930-31 (2004) (arguing against the restriction of fiduciary duty waivers in 
limited partnerships). 
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activities,75 allowing managers to engage in practices that overstate their returns 
and enable them to receive inflated incentive compensation,76 and failing to 
provide adequate disclosure of portfolio company fees and other fees.77 
One particularly controversial practice drawing media scrutiny in recent 
years has been the custom of requiring investors to sign non-disclosure 
provisions prohibiting them from sharing LPAs with any third parties.78 
Commentators have argued that these provisions are included by managers 
primarily to prevent the public from evaluating LPAs and exposing the unfair 
provisions in them,79 and to make it difficult for investors to benchmark and 
compare LPAs against each other. Concerns in this area even led one 
commentator to create a publicly available collection of “leaked” private equity 
fund LPAs, including LPAs from many of the largest private equity managers 
 
75. See, e.g., Anupreeta Das & Juliet Chung, Wall Street’s New Problem: When Fund Titans 
Invest on the Side, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 26, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/wall-streets-new-
problem-when-fund-titans-invest-on-the-side-1493218214 [https://perma.cc/MQ66-CAMM] (“Wall 
Street billionaires, their fortunes built by investing other people’s money, increasingly are putting some 
of their own in sideline investment ventures, while continuing to operate their hedge funds or private-
equity funds for clients. The side businesses . . . are a growing concern to the pension funds, university 
endowments and other institutional investors that make up the clientele of hedge funds and private-
equity funds.”). 
76. See, e.g., Chris Flood, Private Equity’s Dirty Finance Secret, FIN. TIMES (July 27, 2017), 
https://www.ft.com/content/48d107b2-5fed-11e7-91a7-502f7ee26895 [https://perma.cc/T7GX-QHZ6] 
(“Money promised by investors is increasingly being used by private equity managers as security for 
bank loans that are then used to pay for deals in place of a client’s capital. This little-discussed 
technique, known as subscription-line financing, helps private equity managers earn performance fees 
because one of their funds’ key assessment metrics, the internal rate of return, is based on the date an 
investor’s cash is put to work.”). 
77. See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, Challenging Private Equity Fees Tucked in Footnotes, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/18/business/challenging-private-equity-
fees-tucked-in-footnotes.html [https://perma.cc/9X2V-3XNB] (“How much do private equity investors 
pay to the firms overseeing their portfolios? You might think such a question would be a no-brainer. But 
in the supersecret world of private equity, it is anything but.”); Gretchen Morgenson, Private Equity 
Funds Balk at Disclosure, and Public Risk Grows, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/03/business/private-equity-funds-balk-at-disclosure-and-public-risk-
grows.html [https://perma.cc/87HL-CLJM]; Dan Primack, Private Equity’s New Fee Trick, FORTUNE 
(July 1, 2013), https://fortune.com/2013/07/01/private-equitys-new-fee-trick [https://perma.cc/27CS-
6V9P] (“Most limited partnership agreements allow for additional fees to be charged if the fund is 
required to hire outside help, such as in the case of a serious legal issue. But . . . some general partners 
are hiring others for tasks that should reasonably be expected to fall under the management fee, in order 
to juice the bottom line.”). 
78. See, e.g., Madison Marriage & Chris Newlands, Pension Funds Forced to Sign Non-
Disclosure Agreements, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2014), https://www.ft.com/content/94524a60-5b96-11e4-
81ac-00144feab7de [https://perma.cc/7F39-SFHD] (“Anger has erupted over the practice of asset 
managers coercing pension funds into signing non-disclosure agreements.”); Gretchen Morgenson, 
Behind Private Equity’s Curtain, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/19/business/retirement/behind-private-equitys-curtain.html 
[https://perma.cc/9TTN-GM79] (“[I]n exchange for what they hope will be hefty returns, many pension 
funds have signed onto a kind of omerta, or code of silence, about the terms of the funds’ investments.”). 
79. See, e.g., Marriage & Newlands, supra note 78 (“Critics believe the non-disclosure 
agreements allow fund managers to overcharge some of their pension clients significantly.”); Gretchen 
Morgenson, The Deal’s Done. But Not the Fees, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/25/business/the-deals-done-but-not-the-fees.html 
[https://perma.cc/4WPN-MT7E] (quoting SEC official Andrew Bowden as saying in an exclusive 
interview that “in some instances, investors’ pockets are being picked”). 
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in the industry.80 These criticisms of LPAs are part of a long list of journalistic 
critiques brought against the private equity industry, relating to various 
controversial practices in the industry.81 
3. The SEC’s Critique 
The scholarly and journalistic criticism described above has helped to 
draw attention to the controversial elements of private equity fund LPAs. But 
the most impactful critique—the one that has done the most to draw attention to 
concerns about LPAs—came from the SEC. In the years following the financial 
crisis, the SEC launched an industry-wide “sweep” of the private equity 
industry. The goal was for the SEC to establish a presence within the private 
equity industry82 following the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act, which gave 
the SEC authority to perform examinations on a much wider universe of fund 
managers.83 Because private equity LPAs and other fund documentation are 
almost never publicly filed, the SEC’s newly expanded authority gave it an 
opportunity to become more familiar with the unique issues surrounding the 
private equity business model. 
Following this initiative, the SEC publicly announced strongly worded 
criticisms of what examiners found in the LPAs they examined.84 Specifically, 
 
80. Private Equity Limited Partnership Agreements, NAKED CAPITALISM, 
https://nakedcapitalism.net/documents.html [https://perma.cc/PC42-HXVR] (last visited Sept. 12, 2019). 
81. See, e.g., Pat Garofalo, The Real Scandal in Private Equity? It’s the Taxes, THE ATLANTIC 
(Jan. 17, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/01/the-real-scandal-in-private-
equity-its-the-taxes/251463 [https://perma.cc/25LY-CFE6] (“[T]here’s no value added by letting private 
equity managers treat the paycheck they receive as capital gains: that particular tax loophole just lets 
very wealthy money managers avoid paying the top tax rate, for no real reason.”); Josh Kosman, Why 
Private Equity Firms Like Bain Really Are the Worst of Capitalism, ROLLING STONE (May 23, 2012), 
https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/why-private-equity-firms-like-bain-really-are-the-
worst-of-capitalism-241519 [https://perma.cc/8H6M-3XFE] (describing private equity as “a predatory 
system created and perpetuated by Wall Street solely to pump its own profits”); Steven Pearlstein, The 
$786 Million Question: Does Steve Schwarzman—or Anyone—Deserve to Make That Much?, WASH. 
POST (Jan. 4, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/the-786-million-question-does-steve-
schwarzman--or-anyone--deserve-to-make-that-much/2019/01/04/ea9f9e9c-0df1-11e9-84fc-
d58c33d6c8c7_story.html [https://perma.cc/JY8F-LXXJ] (“[I]f we, as a society, decide that we find the 
current distribution of income unacceptable—if it offends our moral intuitions that a single financier 
earns as much in a year as 15,000 elementary school teachers—then it violates no great moral or 
economic principle to alter that distribution.”); James Surowiecki, Private Inequity, NEW YORKER (Jan. 
22, 2012), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/01/30/private-inequity [https://perma.cc/9Z84-
KMUC] (describing the wealth created by private equity as derived “not from management or investing 
skills but, rather, from the way the U.S. tax system works”). 
82. See Bowden, supra note 7 (stating that the exam initiative was designed to “establish a 
presence with the private equity industry and to better assess the issues and risks presented by its unique 
business model”). 
83. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
tit. IV, 124 Stat. 1376, 1570 (2010) (eliminating the “private adviser” exemption to registration 
requirements under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, which had the effect of requiring all but a 
small minority of private fund managers to register with the SEC and become subject to the SEC’s 
examination authority). 
84. In this Article, I focus on the SEC’s claim that private equity fund LPAs are deficient. To 
be sure, the SEC’s remarks also condemned a number of activities that clearly breached LPA terms. In 
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the SEC raised the issue of portfolio company fees, noting that broad language 
in LPAs enabled managers to charge fees and expenses at the portfolio 
company level that were “not reasonably contemplated by investors.”85 This 
helped create an environment where, according to the SEC, “violations of law 
or material weaknesses in controls” related to fees and expenses were observed 
in more than half of the funds that were examined.86 The SEC also indicated 
other areas where lack of clarity in the LPA gave managers too much discretion 
in their interactions with investors, including with respect to asset valuation, 
fund investment strategies, and protocols for mitigating conflicts of interest.87 
The SEC also criticized the light disclosure requirements set forth in 
LPAs. SEC examiners found that LPAs did not provide investors with 
sufficient information rights to be able to monitor their investments adequately, 
and that they had broad, imprecise language, which enabled managers to be 
opaque in areas where investors would benefit from transparency.88 This was, 
from the SEC’s perspective, the most important finding of the examination 
initiative, reinforcing the view of academics that poor disclosure has 
compounding effects that weaken other forms of investor protection in private 
equity funds.89 
All in all, the SEC’s comments were a sweeping rebuke of common 
practices throughout the private equity industry, and they pointedly questioned 
the adequacy of the LPA as a source of investor protection. 
B. The Industry’s Negotiation-Based Defense 
In response to the various critiques levied against LPAs, the private equity 
industry90 has frequently defended itself by arguing that these agreements are 
 
those cases, the problem had to do with the manager’s conduct, not with shortcomings in the LPAs that 
permitted managers to engage in harmful conduct. This Article is interested in the deficient LPAs. 
85. Bowden, supra note 7 (“Many limited partnership agreements are broad in their 
characterization of the types of fees and expenses that can be charged to portfolio companies (as 
opposed to being borne by the adviser). This has created an enormous grey area, allowing advisers to 
charge fees and pass along expenses that are not reasonably contemplated by investors.”). 
86. Id. (“When we have examined how fees and expenses are handled by advisers to private 
equity funds, we have identified what we believe are violations of law or material weaknesses in 
controls over 50% of the time.”). 
87. Id. (“We’ve also seen limited partnership agreements lacking clearly defined valuation 
procedures, investment strategies, and protocols for mitigating certain conflicts of interest, including 
investment and co-investment allocation.”). 
88. Id. (“[M]ost importantly, we see that most limited partnership agreements do not provide 
limited partners with sufficient information rights to be able to adequately monitor not only their 
investments, but also the operations of their manager. Of course, many managers voluntarily provide 
important information and disclosures to their investors, but we find that broad, imprecise language in 
limited partnership agreements often leads to opaqueness when transparency is most needed.”). 
89. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text. 
90. References to the “private equity industry” in this Article refer primarily to private equity 
industry trade groups, including the American Investment Council (formerly known as the Private 
Equity Growth Capital Council), a national trade association, and the Association for Corporate Growth, 
a trade association focused on middle-market private equity. See AM. INV. COUNCIL, 
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highly negotiated documents.91 This defense, which I call the “private equity 
negotiation myth,” assumes that large investors can be relied on to negotiate for 
 
https://www.investmentcouncil.org [https://perma.cc/MZ37-26TU]; ASS’N CORP. GROWTH GLOBAL, 
https://www.acg.org [https://perma.cc/YZ7E-KSW9]. 
91. See, e.g., Am. Inv. Council, Comment Letter on Proposed Commission Interpretation 
Regarding Standard of Conduct for Investment Advisers (Feb. 25, 2019), 
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-09-18/s70918-4970860-182100.pdf [https://perma.cc/UQJ9-CUZC] 
(“[T]he terms of the LPA are determined after a robust negotiation process that results in the private 
equity fund sponsor and the fund’s limited partners agreeing on the terms of an investment fund in 
advance of their admission to the fund.”); Am. Inv. Council, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule for 
Adviser Business Continuity and Transition Plans (Sept. 6, 2016), 
https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2016/ia-4439.pdf [https://perma.cc/37D5-65FM] (“[T]he limited 
partnership agreements (or other documents) governing fund operations contain specific, negotiated 
provisions concerning changes in management and ownership and the liquidation of the fund, which we 
believe accurately reflect what investors expect to happen in times of stress or transition.”); ASS’N FOR 
CORP. GROWTH, PRIVATE EQUITY REGULATORY & COMPLIANCE PRINCIPLES 26 (2017), 
https://www.acg.org/sites/files/ACGPERT_PERCPrinciples.pdf [https://perma.cc/C327-2WV6] (“Terms 
relating to disclosures and reporting in fund LPAs and side letters are highly negotiated, and reflect the 
mutually-agreed upon terms between the Manager and the Limited Partners. . . . Firms enter into a 
highly-negotiated Limited Partnership Agreement (‘LPA’) with their investors, which may describe the 
valuation process to be used for that particular Fund.”); ASS’N FOR CORP. GROWTH, SEC TASK FORCE 
SURVEY (2014) (“The allocation of fees and expenses between the general partner of a fund and the 
limited partners is highly negotiated and memorialized in a formal limited partnership agreement, or 
LPA.”); Jason Mulvihill, Standardization in PE: Needed Trend or Impractical Solution in Search of a 
Problem?, in AM. INV. COUNCIL, STATE OF THE INDUSTRY 9, 9 (2017) (“Calls for greater 
standardization of private equity documents frequently derive from a misunderstanding about the 
inherent transparency and long-standing success of funds vis-à-vis their investors. As a general 
proposition, bespoke partnership agreements reflect extensive negotiations between fund sponsors and 
their sophisticated investors and have served investors and managers well.”); Stephen Beale, Firms Paid 
Millions to Manage RI Pension Money They Didn’t Have, GOLOCAL PROVIDENCE NEWS (July 9, 2015), 
https://www.golocalprov.com/news/firms-paid-millions-to-manage-ri-pension-money-they-didnt-have 
[https://perma.cc/R7L4-KMCN] (quoting James Maloney, spokesman for the Private Equity Growth 
Capital Council, as saying, “[Limited partners,] such as pension funds, incentivize private equity 
managers to locate the best returns for them. . . . All of this is negotiated and explicitly agreed upon in 
the limited partner agreement”); Chris Flood, SEC Issues Fresh Warning to Private Equity, FIN. TIMES 
(May 31, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/f47fc044-0540-11e5-8612-00144feabdc0 
[https://perma.cc/H95V-P5GM] (“Steve Judge, chief executive of the Private Equity Growth Capital 
Council, a trade body, said agreements between private equity managers and institutional investors were 
‘the result of highly negotiated terms between sophisticated parties.’”); Steve Judge, Confidentiality of 
Limited Partnership Agreements Is Paramount, PE HUB NETWORK (Nov. 3, 2014), 
https://www.pehub.com/2014/11/confidentiality-of-limited-partnership-agreements-is-paramount 
[https://perma.cc/TA2X-86YP] (“LPAs are highly negotiated agreements between sophisticated parties 
and, in the case of public pensions, are entered into by individuals who have a fiduciary duty to act in 
the best interests of beneficiaries. So it goes beyond reason to believe that they would enter into any 
agreement that would violate that duty.”); Steve Judge, Private Equity and Pensions: A Strong 
Partnership, PE HUB NETWORK (June 30, 2015), https://www.pehub.com/2015/06/private-equity-and-
pensions-a-strong-partnership/ [https://perma.cc/K22Z-WAR7] (“[Pension plans] understand very well 
the investments they are making: They receive extensive disclosure, conduct due diligence, heavily 
negotiate essentially every aspect of a fund’s terms before investing, and pension funds take very 
seriously their responsibilities to the pensioners they represent.”); Morgenson, supra note 79 (“Asked 
about the SEC’s criticisms, Steve Judge, chief executive of the Private Equity Growth Capital Council, 
the industry’s lobbying group, said in a statement: ‘Every private equity fund agreement is negotiated by 
professional investment managers on both sides, creating an alignment of interests that consistently 
delivers the best returns—net of fees—of any asset class over the long-term.’”); Greg Roumeliotis & 
Karen Freifeld, Analysis, New York AG’s Private Equity Probe May Have Little Bite, REUTERS (Sept. 7, 
2012), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-private-equity-tax-idUSBRE88606E20120907 
[https://perma.cc/BP97-QB7Y] (“‘Management fee waivers are legal, widely recognized, and often part 
of negotiated agreements between the alternative investment community and investors, including 
pension funds and endowments,’ said Steve Judge, president of Private Equity Growth Capital Council, 
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protections that will benefit all investors in a fund. This is a process-based 
response to the substantive criticisms that have been brought against private 
equity fund LPAs. Rather than seek to establish that the terms of LPAs 
themselves are substantively fair, by invoking the private equity negotiation 
myth, private equity industry representatives have argued that the process by 
which the terms were generated is fair. In other words, the industry has used a 
process-based argument to tell critics that there is “nothing to see” in private 
equity fund LPAs. 
While negotiation is not the only process by which fair terms can be 
created in a contract,92 evidence of robust negotiation between knowledgeable 
and properly incentivized parties would certainly create a strong presumption 
that neither party is taking advantage of the other. Classical contract theory 
holds that unrestricted freedom of contract93 between parties with equal 
bargaining power, skill, and knowledge of relevant market conditions 
maximizes individual welfare and promotes the most efficient allocation of 
resources in the marketplace.94 
If private equity fund LPA terms have always been the product of a fair 
process,95 it would suggest that the criticisms of LPAs by scholars and 
policymakers96 might have been overblown. How could this be the case? One 
explanation could be that the vague and open-ended terms that have historically 
been in LPAs were that way simply because private equity funds typically last 
a long time and are therefore necessarily incomplete contracts.97 Trying to 
foresee all of the many contingencies that can arise over a fund’s ten-year life 
span, let alone craft contractual arrangements for each of those contingencies, 
 
the industry’s lobby group.”); Neil Weinberg & Darrell Preston, Look Who’s Coming to Private Equity’s 
Defense on Fee Secrecy, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Aug. 25, 2016), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-08-25/look-who-s-coming-to-private-equity-s-defense-
on-fee-secrecy [https://perma.cc/TA4H-B9DY] (“‘The terms of industry contracts are negotiated over 
months between sophisticated parties,’ says James Maloney, a spokesman for the American Investment 
Council, a private equity trade group in Washington.”). 
92. See infra Section III.B.1. 
93. For foundational analyses of the doctrine of freedom of contract, see generally Morris R. 
Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553 (1933), and Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 
YALE L.J. 454 (1909). 
94. See supra note 10. 
95. As noted above, I am not arguing in this Article that strong process-based arguments do 
not exist. Rather, I am simply challenging the particular negotiation-based defense raised by the 
industry, which assumes that large investors can be relied on to demand LPA terms that will benefit all 
investors in a fund. See supra note 20. 
96. To be clear, this Article is focusing on criticisms of LPAs themselves, not on criticisms of 
other activities by managers that could be viewed as breaches of LPA terms. 
97. The literature of incomplete contracting is deep and various theories exist beyond those 
discussed in the body of the text above. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson et al., Contracting for Innovation: 
Vertical Disintegration and Interfirm Collaboration, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 431 (2009); Oliver Hart & 
John Moore, Contracts as Reference Points, 123 Q.J. ECON. 1 (2008); Kathryn E. Spier, Incomplete 
Contracts and Signaling, 23 RAND J. ECON. 432 (1992); Maija Halonen-Akatwijuka & Oliver Hart, 
Continuing Contracts (Aug. 2016) (unpublished article), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2833362. 
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can be very difficult and costly.98 In the case of portfolio fees, for example, it 
could have been the case that at the time of contracting, investors and managers 
lacked the information necessary to fully determine the appropriate amount of 
compensation, and that some amount of flexibility and discretion was needed. 
This would be consistent with findings in the procurement literature, which 
highlights the importance of allowing agents to charge ex-post adaption costs.99 
Another explanation for vague terms could be grounded in measurement and 
verification challenges.100 It could have been the case that the level of 
performance which the investors and manager jointly deemed satisfactory was 
more complex or nuanced than courts would be able to discern. Rather than run 
the risk of courts misinterpreting the parties’ intentions, parties may have 
preferred to put vague standards in the LPA and rely on reputational incentives 
instead of terms that can be litigated. 
Plausible explanations for some of the other controversial elements of 
private equity LPAs can also be imagined. Accordingly, evaluating process 
rather than substance in this area may not actually be a bad idea. Judging the 
substantive quality of LPA terms as an outside observer is inherently difficult, 
and no outside critic can claim to know what the optimal substantive terms for 
every LPA should be (though many, as shown above, have certainly weighed 
in).101 Nevertheless, for the reasons developed in Part III, the process-based 
negotiation defense put forward by the industry is not a sufficient defense in 
and of itself. 
III. Problems with the Myth 
The private equity industry’s frequent invocation of the negotiation 
myth102 demands a closer look at the role of bargaining power and negotiation 
in private equity funds. The myth assumes that investors with bargaining power 
in private equity funds use their bargaining power to demand robust and 
 
98. For early work discussing the relationship between transaction costs and incomplete 
contracts, see, for example, R.A. Dye, Costly Contract Contingencies, 26 INT’L ECON. REV. 233 (1985), 
and Oliver Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. 
& ECON. 233 (1979). 
99. See, e.g., Patrick Bajari, Stephanie Houghton & Steven Tadelis, Bidding for Incomplete 
Contracts: An Empirical Analysis of Adaptation Costs, 104 AM. ECON. REV. 1288 (2014); Patrick Bajari 
& Steven Tadelis, Incentives Versus Transaction Costs: A Theory of Procurement Contracts, 32 RAND 
J. ECON. 387 (2001); Keith Crocker & Kenneth Reynolds, The Efficiency of Incomplete Contracts: An 
Empirical Analysis of Air Force Engine Procurement, 24 RAND J. ECON. 126 (1993). 
100. In certain kinds of arrangements, it will be difficult for the parties to specify their 
respective duties in the contract such that they can be verified by a third party like a court. In these 
cases, rather than leave enforcement of the parties’ obligations to a court whose decisions may be 
unpredictable or incorrect, parties may prefer to rely on their own methods of recourse, including the 
parties’ incentive to maintain a good reputation and ability to walk away from doing further business 
with the counter-party. See Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, Incomplete Contracts and 
Strategic Ambiguity, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 902 (1998). 
101. See supra Section II.A. 
102. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
  
The Private Equity Negotiation Myth 
89 
adequate LPA protections that all investors can enjoy. This Part challenges that 
assumption.103 
A. Large Investors Cannot Be Counted on to Negotiate LPAs 
1. Why Large Investors Have Bargaining Power 
Before we can assess how investors use bargaining power, we first need to 
identify which investors have bargaining power. Because the securities laws 
establish minimum net worth requirements for investing in a private equity 
fund,104 “ordinary” people typically do not invest in private equity funds under 
the current rules.105 The securities laws do, however, allow for an extremely 
wide range of investors. On the one hand, private equity fund investors can 
include individuals like entrepreneurs, doctors, and lawyers, and small 
institutions like modestly sized pension plans, endowments, and foundations 
(as long as they have at least $5 million in assets).106 On the other hand, the ten 
institutions with the greatest exposure to private equity in 2017 each had 
between $21 billion and $52 billion allocated to the private equity asset class 
and total assets in the hundreds of billions.107 When compared with the largest 
 
103. A description of various forms of individualized benefits that can be negotiated for in 
private equity funds can be found in Section III.D. 
104. The current minimum standards for investing in private equity funds are rooted in private 
equity managers’ desire to avoid registering under the federal securities laws, as registration imposes 
obligations on managers that are costly and incompatible with the business plan and management 
structure of a typical private equity fund. See SCHELL ET AL., supra note 39, § 8.03 (“[T]he substantive 
requirements imposed on registered investment companies are not compatible with the business plan and 
management structure of a typical private equity fund.”). To avoid registration under the Securities Act 
of 1933, all of a fund’s investors typically must be “accredited investors” meeting certain net worth 
thresholds ($5 million for most entities and $1 million for individuals). See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) 
(2019) (defining “accredited investor”). But see infra note 181. Registration under the Investment 
Company Act of 1940 (the “Investment Company Act”) can be avoided if a fund has fewer than 100 
investors or, alternatively, if a fund’s investors are all “qualified purchasers” who satisfy a different set 
of net worth thresholds (generally $25 million for entities and $5 million for individuals). See 
Investment Company Act of 1940 § 3(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3 (2018) (imposing no sophistication 
requirements for funds with fewer than 100 investors); id. § 3(c)(7) (allowing a fund to raise an 
unlimited amount of money from an unlimited number of investors if they are all “qualified 
purchasers”). Various other exemptions to the Investment Company Act exist, but these are the most 
commonly used. Furthermore, if managers want to charge carried interest, their investors must also meet 
the “qualified client” standard set forth in Rule 205-3 of the Advisers Act, which currently requires 
entities and natural persons to have a net worth of at least $2 million or an investment with the manager 
of at least $1 million. 17 C.F.R. § 275.205-3 (2019). 
105. Of course, as noted above, the SEC is currently in the process of considering changes to 
these rules that would make them more permissive. See supra notes 23 and 24. 
106. Available evidence suggests that small institutional investors, which often invest on 
behalf of middle-class workers, universities, and charitable institutions, are regular investors in today’s 
private equity funds. See, e.g., Joseph Borda, Endowment Plans’ Private Equity Allocation by Assets 
Under Management, PREQIN (Jan. 26, 2016), https://www.preqin.com/blog/0/13413/endowments-in-
private-equity [https://perma.cc/8DV2-LG3C] (reporting the results of a survey showing that small 
endowments with less than $500 million in assets represented 60% of all endowment plans investing in 
private equity funds, but only 6% of the total capital invested by endowments in private equity). 
107. See PREQIN, GLOBAL PRIVATE EQUITY & VENTURE CAPITAL REPORT 93 (2017). 
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investors, investors that would seem quite substantial in any other context will 
be relatively small in many private equity funds. 
Large investors generally have greater bargaining power with private 
equity fund managers than smaller investors for two reasons. First, having a 
large amount of investable assets can give an investor greater bargaining 
power.108 When managers know that an investor has a large amount of capital 
that could be invested in the manager’s future funds or other product 
offerings,109 they will be more inclined to accommodate its requests in order to 
keep that investor happy. In addition, larger institutions that make a higher 
volume of private equity investments are more likely to have larger investment 
teams available to negotiate their private equity fund investments—so they are 
likely to be more inclined to use their bargaining power.110 
Second, large investors have greater bargaining power with managers 
because they tend to make larger investments in each individual fund that they 
invest in. The size of an investment has two important effects. One, it increases 
an investor’s bargaining power with a fund manager because that manager will 
have more to lose if the investor chooses to walk away from the investment. 
Two, when an investor makes a larger investment in a fund, that investor will 
find it easier to justify spending on legal and other advisory expenses necessary 
to negotiate the terms of that investment. For example, if an investor makes a 
$100 million investment in a fund, spending $50,000 in legal fees to negotiate 
the terms of that investment will repay itself if it leads to a 0.05% increase in 
the value of the investor’s overall investment. But if an investor is making a 
$100,000 investment in a fund, spending $50,000 in legal fees will only make 
sense if it generates at least a 50% increase in the value of the investor’s overall 
investment—which is clearly far less likely to happen. For both of these 
reasons, when an investor makes a larger investment in a fund, they are more 
likely to engage in negotiations over the terms of that investment. 
 
108. See Aleksander Andonov, Rob Bauer & Martijn Cremers, Can Large Pension Funds Beat 
the Market? Asset Allocation, Market Timing, Security Selection, and the Limits of Liquidity (Network 
for Studies on Pensions, Aging & Ret., Working Paper No. 62, 2012), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2214931 [https://perma.cc/J3QC-88QL] (finding that larger funds can assert 
more negotiation power in alternative asset classes than smaller investors). 
109. Many private equity managers offer different funds focusing on a wide range of strategies 
and industries. See Andrew Tuch, The Remaking of Wall Street, 7 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 315 (2017) 
(noting the expansion and diversification of private equity firm activities); Helen Thomas, Carlyle Buys 
55% in Credit Investor Claren Road, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2010), https://www.ft.com/content/2122b882-
0162-11e0-8392-00144feab49a [https://perma.cc/7AX2-VEVV] (“Many of the world’s biggest private 
equity groups are diversifying geographically and pushing into different asset classes as they seek to 
enlarge the range of products they can offer investors.”). 
110. Cf. Morris & Phalippou, supra note 57, at 74 (“Many private equity investors are small. 
They may have just one person allocating capital to private equity, who may also be responsible for 
other alternative investments. These institutions may simply lack the resources to benchmark complex 
contracts, performance data and the like.”). 
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2. Diminished Incentives to Negotiate LPA Terms 
While it is true that most large investors have at least some bargaining 
power, their incentives to negotiate fund agreements may often be weaker than 
the negotiation myth suggests.111 This is because large investors have strong 
incentives to use their bargaining power to negotiate for personal benefits—
benefits that they do not need to share with other investors in the funds—before 
they expend their bargaining power on the terms in LPAs.112 
Why is this? Unlike large investors in a corporation,113 it is extremely 
common for large private equity fund investors to negotiate for various forms 
of individualized benefits in private equity funds,114 where the benefit of the 
negotiated bargain is not shared with all of the other investors in the fund. 
These benefits are typically documented in a “side letter” to the LPA, which 
modifies the terms of the LPA as they apply to the investor that is the recipient 
of the side letter.115 
If we assume that large private equity fund investors have a finite amount 
of bargaining power,116 and that they want to use their bargaining power in a 
manner that maximizes their personal benefit, negotiating for strong fund-wide 
protections will usually be a second-best use of that bargaining power from an 
efficiency perspective. Instead, a large investor will generally be better off 
using its bargaining power to obtain as many individualized benefits as possible 
before it “spends” its bargaining power on benefits that other investors will also 
enjoy. In this context, an “efficient” use of bargaining power refers to one that 
achieves as much personal benefit as possible in return for the investor’s 
bargaining power. 
 
111. This assessment is consistent with anecdotal observations by Leo Strine, Chief Justice of 
the Delaware Supreme Court, and Travis Laster, Vice Chancellor of the Delaware Chancery Court. See 
Strine & Laster, supra note 21, at 11 (“Based on the cases we have decided and our reading of many 
other cases decided by our judicial colleagues, we do not discern evidence of arms-length bargaining 
between the sponsors of the alternative entities and the investors in the governing instruments of 
alternative entities that raise capital from diverse investors. . . . [B]argaining, at best, occurs 
only sometimes.”). 
112. To be clear, I am not saying that LPAs are never negotiated. Rather, I am saying that 
LPA terms are unlikely to be a very high priority when large investors are deciding how to use their 
bargaining power. 
113. See supra note 11. 
114. Section III.D provides a short summary of many of the individualized benefits that large 
investors can negotiate for in private equity funds. 
115. See SCHELL ET AL., supra note 39, § 11.14 (“A side letter is an agreement between a 
Fund and one of its investors, which establishes a series of investment terms that supplement or modify 
the terms of the partnership agreement with respect to that investor.”). Because separately managed 
accounts are distinct entities from any pooled funds, they typically have their own LPAs and therefore 
are not provided for in side letters. 
116. The validity of this premise seems self-evident. When a manager negotiates with a large 
investor, it will be willing to make certain concessions to that investor due to its size and influence. 
However, at the point when the requested concessions outweigh the expected benefit that the manager 
expects to receive from the large investor’s investment, the manager will push back on the request or 
reject the investor’s investment. 
  
Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 37:67, 2020 
92 
This claim is grounded in the idea that whenever an investor seeks a term 
in an LPA that would benefit all investors in the fund, it will generate 
asymmetric value and costs between the large investor and the manager. This 
asymmetry will be created anytime the negotiating investor would enjoy only a 
fraction of the benefit provided by a requested LPA protection (because that 
investor holds only a partial ownership interest in the fund), while the manager 
would bear the whole corresponding cost of that protection. Even though an 
investor may be able to persuade a manager to grant concessions that have 
asymmetric benefits and losses, more of that investor’s bargaining power will 
be exhausted in the process. In other words, the greater the loss that a requested 
protection will inflict on a manager, the more bargaining power a large investor 
will have to spend to obtain that protection. 
For example, consider a case where a large investor wants to insert a term 
into the LPA ensuring that the manager’s fiduciary duties to investors under 
state law have not been waived or modified by any provisions in the LPA.117 
Assume that this term will restrict the manager’s activities in a manner that will 
result in a $1 million loss for the manager over the life of the fund and a $1 
million gain for the overall fund. However, because the requesting investor 
only owns a portion of the pooled fund, that investor will only enjoy a fraction 
of the benefit generated by this affirmation of the manager’s fiduciary duties. 
For example, if the negotiating investor owns a 10% interest in the fund, 
bargaining for this affirmation will generate a $100,000 benefit for the 
negotiating investor and will impose a $1 million loss on the manager, as 




If, however, instead of requesting an LPA provision that affirms the 
manager’s fiduciary duties, the large investor were to ask the manager to give it 
the expected value of the affirmation ($100,000) in the form of an 
 
117. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text for a discussion of the common practicing 
of modifying and waiving fiduciary duties under state law. 
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individualized deal that is not shared with other investors,118 the picture looks 
different. In such a scenario, none of the value created by that negotiation 
would benefit free riders, and the large investor would be equally well off, as 
illustrated in Figure D below. This is clearly a more efficient use of the large 







The same logic applies when there are multiple investors that request an 
LPA affirming the manager’s fiduciary duties. For example, in Figure E below, 
in addition to the 10% investor discussed above, there are three other investors 
who also each own 10% of the interests in the fund and who also request an 
affirmation of the manager’s fiduciary duties in the LPA. Even though multiple 
investors are requesting the affirmation in this example, free riders still 
consume most of the benefit that is generated by the term. As a result, none of 
these investors will receive the full benefit of the bargaining power that they 
spend by negotiating for the affirmation of the manager’s fiduciary duties. Each 
of them thus has a strong incentive to use their bargaining power to negotiate 







118. A large investor could, for example, negotiate to pay less in management fees by an 
amount that “offsets” the expected harm from the manager breaching its fiduciary duties. If this 
provision only benefits the large investor, it would consume less of the investor’s bargaining power than 
an LPA term that affirms the manager’s fiduciary duties. 
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At this point, readers familiar with the private equity fund contracting 
process might insist that the benefits conveyed in side letters often are not truly 
“individualized” because some of the other investors in the fund may have 
“most favored nation” rights. A most favored nation (“MFN”) right is typically 
granted in an investor’s side letter, and it gives that investor the right to see side 
letters granted to other investors in the fund and to receive the same rights and 
privileges given in those side letters.  
However, MFN provisions usually only entitle an investor to receive the 
rights and privileges given to investors who have made investments in the fund 
of equal or lesser value.119 Because of this, the logic above still applies even 
when some investors have MFN rights—investors will still strongly prefer to 
use their bargaining power to negotiate for side letter benefits before they 
negotiate for LPA terms. 
Let’s see how the incentives of the investors in our hypothetical fund—
with four 10% investors, and an assortment of smaller investors—change when 
all investors in the fund have MFN rights that entitle them to receive the rights 
given to other investors making similarly-sized investments. If one of the 10% 
investors negotiates for a side-letter benefit, the MFN right will kick in for 
investors that have made investments in the fund of the same or greater size. In 
this case, each of the three other 10% investors will have a right to receive the 
same benefit. Thus, if the negotiating 10% investor bargains for a side letter 
benefit worth $100,000 in value, it will result in $100,000 in value also going 
to each of the other three 10% investors, who get to free ride on the negotiation 
thanks to their MFN rights. Effectively, the negotiating investor will spend 
$400,000 of bargaining power to obtain a $100,000 benefit, with $300,000 




119. See SCHELL ET AL., supra note 39, § 11.14 (“An MFN provision usually requires the 
Sponsor to provide similarly-situated investors (i.e., those with equivalent Capital Commitments or 
regulatory circumstances) the opportunity to elect to receive the rights and benefits provided via side 
letter to other investors in the same Fund.”). 
120. The situation would be different if, for example, the negotiating investor held a 15% 
stake in the fund and the other three investors held 10% stakes. In this case, the 15% investor’s 
incentives would be completely unaffected by MFN rights because no other investors in the fund would 
be entitled to receive the side letter terms that it negotiates for. As a result, any benefits that the 15% 
investor were to receive in a side letter would be truly “individualized” because no free riders would get 
the benefit of them. 
  




Figure F  
 
Accordingly, if the negotiating 10% investor is deciding between 
negotiating for a fiduciary duty affirmation in the LPA worth $1 million for the 
fund and a side letter benefit worth $100,000, the side letter benefit will still be 
a far better use of that investor’s bargaining power. Whereas the side letter 
benefit will result in $300,000 in value going to free riders, the affirmation in 
the LPA will result in $900,000 in value going to free riders, as illustrated in 
Figure C above.121 
The analysis above does not suggest that large investors do not review the 
protections in LPAs or that they are indifferent to them. What it does show is 
that if a large investor can quantify the expected cost of a weak LPA protection, 
it has strong incentives to use its bargaining power to recover that expected lost 
value through individualized benefits before it seeks to negotiate for a more 
robust protection in the LPA. Only after the universe of potential individualized 
benefits has been exhausted will it make sense for a large investor to seek to 
negotiate for improved protections in the LPA. 
Of course, the strength of this incentive will differ from fund to fund, 
depending on the size of the fund and the availability of individualized benefits. 
In general, the larger a fund, the greater the disincentive to negotiate the terms 
in that fund’s LPA. As an individual investor’s percentage interest in a fund 
goes down, the more free riders there will be who benefit when that investor 
negotiates for an improved LPA term. For example, consider a fund with only 
two investors (let’s call them Investor 1 and Investor 2) that each have a 50% 
interest in the fund. In this fund, the disincentive to negotiate will be relatively 
weak. If Investor 1 negotiates for an LPA term affirming the manager’s 
fiduciary duties, for example, 50% of the value from Investor 1’s negotiation 
will go to Investor 2, who did not negotiate for that term. By contrast, if the 
fund is much larger and Investor 1 only holds a 5% interest in it, 95% of the 
value from Investor 1’s negotiation will go to the fund’s other investors. This 
will be a much less efficient use of Investor 1’s bargaining power, and Investor 
 
121. This assumes that no other investors are demanding the same LPA term. 
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1 will have even stronger incentives to negotiate for individualized benefits 
before it seeks to negotiate LPA terms.122 
3. Most Important Protections Are Least Likely to Be Negotiated When 
There Is Information Asymmetry 
The discussion above argues that large investors’ incentive to negotiate is 
diluted, but not necessarily eliminated, by the presence of individualized 
benefits. Interestingly, in situations where the manager has better information 
about the true value of certain LPA protections than investors, we can expect 
that the most important protections that are subject to this information 
asymmetry will be the ones that are least likely to be negotiated. 
For example, in the fiduciary duty affirmation scenarios discussed above, 
we assumed that both the bargaining investors and the manager knew the 
relative costs and benefits of the protection—such that all bargaining parties 
knew that the fiduciary duty affirmation would impose an expected cost on the 
manager of $1 million and would bring an expected benefit of $1 million to the 
fund investors collectively. But this assumption might not always be true. 
Consider an example where the manager expects to breach its fiduciary duties 
in a manner that would result in a $5 million loss to the fund (and a $5 million 
gain for the manager), but the bargaining investors think it will only result in a 
$1 million loss.123 Under these circumstances, the manager will have strong 
incentives to respond to any requests for a fiduciary duty affirmation in the 
LPA with an individualized counter-offer. In this case, if the manager were to 
offer the requesting investor an individualized benefit worth $1 million instead 
of adding a fiduciary duty affirmation to the LPA, the manager would be $4 
million better off than if it had granted the fiduciary duty affirmation in the 
LPA. 
When a protection would restrict an activity that the manager actually 
expects to engage in, the manager will be more reluctant to agree to provide 
that protection in the LPA, and more likely to insist on providing an 
individualized benefit instead. In these cases, the manager has more to lose 
from granting the robust LPA protection, and the fund investors as a whole 
have more to gain from including the LPA protection (even though they do not 
know it). As a result, it is precisely the most important terms in the LPA—the 
ones that protect against activities that are most likely to extract value from the 
fund—that are the least likely to be negotiated when this kind of information 
asymmetry exists. 
 
122. This is a form of collective-action problem in private equity funds that gets worse as the 
fund gets bigger. 
123. This could be related to potential conflicts of interest or other issues implicating fiduciary 
duties that the manager anticipates facing in the future, but which are not apparent to investors now. 
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This dynamic may help to explain some of the LPA deficiencies that the 
SEC uncovered in its sweeping examination of the industry.124 Whereas large 
investors may have thought that the vague fee terms and weak disclosure 
requirements in LPAs were only likely to generate a modest amount of cost to 
the fund, managers might have viewed them as a much more valuable source of 
revenue. This may have given managers a strong incentive to offer 
individualized benefits instead of agreeing to more robust fee and disclosure 
provisions in LPAs, while investors may not have been aware of how much 
value they were actually giving up. 
B. Large Investors Cannot Be Counted on to Vote with Their Feet 
The private equity negotiation myth assumes that large investors will use 
their influence to ensure that LPAs have high-quality protections. Above, I 
questioned whether large investors can be relied on to engage in robust 
negotiations for strong fund protections. But more analysis is needed. Even 
when large investors choose not to negotiate LPAs, they could still wield 
influence by choosing to walk away from funds that have weak terms. Because 
large investors make large investments, managers might still be sensitive to 
their preferences even if they are not actively negotiating for their demands. 
Below, I show why we cannot assume that large investors will wield this 
kind of non-bargaining influence, either. In private equity funds, when large 
investors have bargaining power, it can make them less sensitive to the quality 
of LPA protections because it enables them to negotiate for individualized 
benefits that offset the harm caused by weak protections. This can make them 
more willing to invest in funds with sub-optimal protections than if they lacked 
bargaining power altogether. As a result, the marginal investors in private 
equity funds may sometimes be ones that lack bargaining power, rather than the 
ones that have it. 
1. How Contract Terms Are Shaped in the Absence of Negotiation 
The vast majority of commercial contracts in the modern economy are not 
negotiated.125 But this does not necessarily mean they have unfair terms. 
Throughout the marketplace, parties frequently sign contracts without 
negotiating their terms, opting instead to make take-it-or-leave-it decisions 
based on the quality of the offered terms and the seller’s reputation. 
In contracting settings where the parties do not negotiate, the quality of a 
contract’s protections are shaped by the preferences of that market’s “marginal” 
 
124. See supra Section II.A.3. 
125. See John J. A. Burke, Contract as Commodity: A Nonfiction Approach, 24 SETON HALL 
LEGIS. J. 285, 290 (2000) (“[I]n an advanced economy the standard form contract accounts for more 
than 99% of all contracts used in commercial and consumer transactions for the transfer of goods, 
services and software.”). 
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buyers.126 Marginal buyers are those that care most about the contractual 
protections and are most likely to stop buying a product when the quality of the 
contractual protections go down.127 Accordingly, in situations when the 
protections in a private equity fund LPA are not heavily negotiated, the quality 
of those protections will be determined by how sensitive the industry’s 
marginal investors are to LPA protections.128 
If the marginal investors in private equity funds are informed and rational, 
it means that some quantity of less informed and less rational investors can also 
invest in private equity funds without upsetting the quality of the contract’s 
terms. These investors can effectively “free ride” on the marginal investors, 
enjoying the benefit of high-quality LPA protections even if they would have 
been willing to buy the product with lower-quality terms.129 Identifying the 
marginal investors in private equity funds thus has important policy 
ramifications. 
2. Large Investors Won’t Always Be the Marginal Investors 
For the reasons mentioned above, even if large investors are not actively 
negotiating the terms of LPAs, they could still be regulating the quality of LPA 
protections by consistently choosing to “vote with their feet” by walking away 
from funds with weak protections. If this is true, then the private equity 
negotiation myth may not be so misleading after all. The myth might get the 
details wrong by focusing on the act of negotiation but lead to the right 
conclusion by stating that large investors are demanding (in one way or 
another) high-quality LPA protections. 
Unfortunately, this cannot be assumed, either. In reality, large investors 
cannot be relied on to serve as the marginal investors with respect to LPA 
 
126. This assumes that the market is competitive. See Cole, supra note 14, at 414 (“[N]on-
price terms, like price terms, are ‘policed’ in competitive markets by the marginal consumer for each 
term. Competitors failing to capture the marginal consumer for such terms under competitive market 
conditions suffer the same fate as sellers who fail to compete on price.”). 
127. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
128. See Richard Craswell, Passing on the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and Distribution in 
Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 STAN. L. REV. 361, 373 (1991) (“In markets where different consumers 
attach different values to a warranty, the size of the accompanying price increase will be determined 
largely by the valuations held by those consumers who are on the margin between buying or not buying 
the product/warranty package. These consumers, the marginal consumers, will stop buying the package 
if its price rises; consequently, the willingness to pay of marginal consumers will determine how high 
the price of the combined package will rise.”). 
129. See MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 120 (1993) (“To 
the extent that there is a margin of informed, sophisticated, and aggressive consumers in any given 
market, who understand the terms of the standard form contracts on offer and who either negotiate over 
those terms or switch their business readily to competing suppliers offering more favourable terms, they 
may in effect discipline the entire market, so that inframarginal (less well informed, sophisticated, or 
mobile) consumers can effectively free-ride on the discipline brought to the market by the marginal 
consumers . . . .”); Alan Schwartz, How Much Irrationality Does the Market Permit?, 37 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 131, 131 (2008) (finding that “when enough consumers are sophisticated and the naïve have a 
relatively low willingness to pay for their preferred contract, exploitative contracts decline in frequency 
and may actually vanish”). 
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protections in private equity funds.130 A close evaluation reveals that when 
large investors have bargaining power, it can make them more likely to tolerate 
funds with weak terms than if they had no bargaining power at all. To illustrate, 
Investor A below requires a total expected net present value (“NPV”) of 
$100,000 from investing in Fund Z or it will walk away from making the 
investment. Before considering the effect of sub-optimal LPA protections, an 







However, Fund Z has suboptimal LPA protections which decrease the 
expected NPV of an investment in Fund Z by $175,000. These sub-optimal 
protections could include, for example, an open-ended provision allowing Fund 
Z’s manager to charge unlimited portfolio company fees and an explicit waiver 
of the Fund Z manager’s fiduciary duties. This brings the expected NPV of an 
investment in Fund Z down to $25,000, well below Investor A’s walk-away 
point. This is illustrated in Figure H below, with the shaded rectangle 
representing the lost expected value resulting from sub-optimal terms. 
 
 
130. Because the concept of a marginal investor is theoretical, it is impossible to determine 
with certainty who the “true” marginal investors are in any particular market. See Cole, supra note 14, at 
420 (“The marginal consumer—that one consumer for whom all of the suppliers compete—is unknown 
to the suppliers. All they know is that the marginal consumer is out there.”). 
  




Figure H            
 
If Investor A does not have any bargaining power, the sub-optimal 
protections in Fund Z’s LPA will certainly cause Investor A to walk away from 
an investment in Fund Z. The harm from the sub-optimal protections in Fund 
Z’s LPA bring the expected NPV of Fund Z far below Investor A’s walk-away 
point. 
This conclusion can change, however, if Investor A has bargaining power. 
As discussed above,131 if Investor A has bargaining power, it will have strong 
incentives to use it to negotiate for individualized benefits before it directly 
negotiates to improve the LPA protections in Fund Z. If Investor A can 
negotiate for individualized benefits—in the form of fee discounts, rights to co-
investment opportunities, or otherwise132—of at least $75,000, it will go ahead 
and invest in Fund Z despite the weak LPA protections. When its 
individualized benefits exceed $75,000, Investor A’s expected NPV from 
investing in Fund Z will exceed its walk-away point of $100,000. Thus, even 
though Investor A would have walked away from Fund Z if it lacked 
bargaining power, there is a good chance that it will proceed with the 
investment if Fund Z’s manager is willing to grant individualized benefits when 
Investor A requests them. 
Now consider Investor B. Investor B is smaller than Investor A. It has no 
bargaining power to negotiate for individualized benefits. It also has fewer 
attractive outside investment opportunities than Investor A, so it is willing to 
accept a lower expected NPV for its investment in Fund Z—$50,000—before it 




131. See supra Section III.B.1. 
132. See infra Section III.D. 
  




Figure I            
 
However, after the harm caused by the sub-optimal terms in Fund Z’s 
LPA is taken into consideration, the expected NPV of investing in Fund Z of 
$25,000, which is lower than Investor B’s walk-away point of $50,000. This is 




Figure J     
 
Since Investor B does not have bargaining power to negotiate for any 
individualized benefits that would offset the harm caused by the sub-optimal 
terms, Investor B really will walk away from Fund Z, unlike Investor A. 
The examples above show how bargaining power can cause investors to 
tolerate weaknesses in LPAs that they otherwise would not tolerate. In this 
case, without bargaining power, Investor A would have been more sensitive 
than Investor B to weaknesses in Fund Z’s LPA because its walk-away 
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threshold was much higher than Investor B’s. But because it can negotiate for 
individualized benefits, Investor A can get comfortable with investing in Fund 
Z if the manager is willing to grant it a relatively modest amount of 
individualized benefits.133 Investor B, by contrast, will definitely walk away 
from Fund Z, despite the fact that Investor B’s walk-away point is much lower 
than Investor A’s. 
Because of this, it cannot be assumed that the largest investors in private 
equity funds are the ones that always shape the quality of LPA protections. 
Large investors’ bargaining power can make them less sensitive to the quality 
of LPA protections and less likely to walk away from funds with weak terms. 
This means that the marginal investors in private equity funds may often be 
investors that lack bargaining power, rather than those that have it.134 Thus, by 
focusing attention on large investors, the private equity negotiation myth 
directs policymakers to look in the wrong places when making policy decisions 
that affect the private equity industry. 
C. Agency Problems Can Reduce Incentives to Demand Strong Protections 
All of the analysis above assumes that large investors act rationally to 
maximize returns for their beneficiaries when they make decisions about how 
to utilize their bargaining power. This may not, however, always be true. In 
public pension plans—the largest investors in the private equity industry135—
pension staff members have sometimes been shown to suffer from agency 
problems that affect the way they manage plans.136 
Pension staff members’ personal career concerns could plausibly make 
them less likely to demand strong protections for their plan beneficiaries. On 
the one hand, for any individual employee, personal career benefits from 
aggressively demanding a better fund agreement protection are likely to be 
limited, as the value of that protection may not be realized for many years to 
come, if and when the potential risk addressed by that protection ever 
materializes. But on the other hand, if that employee’s insistence on the 
stronger protection causes some managers to reject the plan and refuse to 
accept its capital, there could be immediate career consequences for the 
employee. This is particularly true if other pension plans in the market are 
 
133. This assumes that Investor A can obtain at least $75,000 in individualized benefits, as the 
example shows. 
134. This is an important distinction if we expect that larger investors have more resources and 
will be more willing to invest time and resources into reviewing LPA terms than smaller investors. One 
study suggests that this is the case. See Da Rin & Phalippou, supra note 28, at 65 (“[T]he only 
consistently significant dimension along which LPs differ in their practices is the size of the private 
equity portfolio (in absolute value). The institutions with large allocations to private equity are those 
spending most time on due diligence for each fund and those undertaking the most initiatives in the due 
diligence process.”). 
135. See supra note 7. 
136. See supra note 18. 
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choosing not to demand the same protections.137 Accordingly, even when it 
would be optimal for a plan’s beneficiaries to demand stronger terms, pension 
employees may hesitate to do so because of their own personal career concerns, 
creating a status quo bias in the market for LPA terms. 
D. Forms of Individualized Benefits in Private Equity 
The incentives described in Sections III.A and III.B above will only exist 
when large investors can negotiate for individualized benefits. To the extent 
that a fund’s manager refuses to grant or otherwise limits individualized 
benefits, large investors will be more likely to demand strong LPA protections. 
However, available data suggests that individualized benefits are quite common 
in the private equity fund industry and are therefore likely to play a significant 
role in shaping large investors’ incentives. These individualized benefits can 
take various forms. Below, I briefly describe some of the individualized 
benefits that managers commonly grant to investors in side letters.138 
1. Fee Discounts 
Fee discounts are a standard practice in the private equity marketplace.139 
Fee terms are commonly viewed as the most heavily negotiated terms when 
investors make investments.140 Large investors most commonly negotiate for 
discounts to management fees, but discounts to carried interest are sometimes 
granted as well.141 Fee discounts are entirely legal as long as managers disclose 
the possibility of differential fee treatment to the fund’s investors. Unlike 
 
137. While pension staffs are supposed to be overseen by boards of trustees, research has 
shown that trustees are often driven by political incentives that deviate from the interests of plan 
beneficiaries. See, e.g., Aleksandar Andonov, Yael Hochberg & Joshua D. Rauh, Political 
Representation and Governance: Evidence from the Investment Decisions of Public Pension Funds, 73 
J. FIN. 2041 (2018) (finding that public pension fund boards heavily populated by politically appointed 
trustees invest in private equity funds that deliver lower returns). 
138. See supra note 115. 
139. See Wulf A. Kaal, Private Fund Fee Structure and Blockchain Applications, in LOWELL 
MILKEN INST. FOR BUS. LAW & POLICY, UCLA SCH. OF LAW, PRIVATE EQUITY FUND REPORT 15, 15 
(2017), https://lowellmilkeninstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Private-Fund-
Conference-2017_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/5CK9-PWHD] (“It has become increasingly common in 
recent years for investors to negotiate fees with fund managers.”); Chris Flood, Private Equity Clings to 
‘2 and 20’ Fee Model, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/f7dc242c-58a9-11e6-
9f70-badea1b336d4 [https://perma.cc/249Z-FNH8] (“Large investors that are prepared to commit a 
significant chunk of money can secure lower management fees, but smaller players simply don’t have 
that kind of leverage.”). 
140. See Victoria Robson, Management Fees Most Heavily Negotiated LPA Point, PRIV. 
EQUITY INT’L (Feb. 17, 2016), https://www.privateequityinternational.com/management-fees-most-
heavily-negotiated-lpa-point/ [https://perma.cc/MX4D-UMKH] (reporting survey results finding that 
management fee terms are the most heavily-negotiated terms in private equity fund negotiations). 
141. Though fee discounts can come in various forms, for purposes of this Article, a basic 
understanding of the fact that fee discounts are commonly requested and granted is sufficient. See Kaal, 
supra note 139, at 15 (“Alternative fee arrangements include but are not limited to modified highwater 
marks, incentive hurdles, and triggers, as well as clawbacks.”). 
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contractual protections that benefit all investors in a fund, a large investor will 
internalize the full benefit of a fee discount that is not shared with other 
investors. 
2. Co-Investments 
“Co-investing” describes arrangements where a manager invites large 
investors to invest alongside the pooled fund in portfolio companies the pooled 
fund is investing in. Co-investments are commonly structured through vehicles 
that aggregate the capital of multiple co-investors for one or more deals. Co-
investment rights are commonly granted to investors that are already 
participating in a manager’s fund through those investors’ side letters.142 In 
such cases, the investor gains exposure to portfolio companies in two ways—
first, through its interest in the fund (which invests in the portfolio company), 
and second, through its “co-investment” directly in the portfolio company.143 
Co-investments are attractive to investors because managers typically 
charge much lower fees on co-investments than they charge for investments in 
their pooled funds,144 with many co-investments offered on a fee-free basis. As 
a result, co-investments commonly outperform pooled funds on a net-of-fees 
basis.145 In addition, when a manager offers a co-investment opportunity, it 
typically gives the investor a chance to consider the opportunity and decide 
whether to accept or reject it. Co-investments thus provide investors with a 
level of control that goes far beyond their rights as investors in a pooled fund. 
Managers feel competitive pressure to grant co-investment opportunities 
because large investors frequently demand them.146 Co-investment rights are 
commonly considered an important part of the overall package when investors 
decide whether to make an investment in a fund,147 and they have become a key 
 
142. See PREQIN, PRIVATE EQUITY CO-INVESTMENT OUTLOOK 5 fig.6 (Nov. 2015), 
https://docs.preqin.com/reports/Preqin-Special-Report-Private-Equity-Co-Investment-Outlook-
November-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/M93L-5UDC] (showing that co-investment rights are most 
commonly granted during the fundraising process); see also infra Appendix A. 
143. See infra Appendix B for a graphic showing an illustrative co-investment arrangement. 
144. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, PRIVATE EQUITY CO-INVESTMENT: BEST PRACTICES 
EMERGING 2 (Jan. 2015), https://www.pwc.com/us/en/financial-services/regulatory-
services/publications/assets/private-equity-co-investment.pdf [https://perma.cc/LF74-7PQM] (“Co-
investors often benefit from lower (or no) management fees and carried interest, as well as greater deal 
selectivity and transparency.”). 
145. See PREQIN, supra note 7, at 55 (presenting survey results showing that (i) 98% of 
investors saw similar or better returns from their co-investments compared to fund returns in 2017 and 
(ii) investors’ two most commonly cited reasons for pursuing co-investments are the expectation of 
lower fees and better returns than pooled fund investments). 
146. Antoine Drean, The Growing Promise and Pitfalls of Private Equity Co-Investment, 
FORBES (July 13, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/antoinedrean/2016/07/13/the-growing-promise-
and-pitfalls-of-private-equity-co-investment [https://perma.cc/manage/create?folder=24184-66233] 
(“Competitive pressure is why the number of managers offering co-investment has grown so much.”). 
147. Marc Wyatt, Acting Dir., Office of Compliance Inspections & Examinations, U.S. Sec. & 
Exch. Comm’n, Address at the Private Equity International Private Fund Compliance Forum: Private 
Equity: A Look Back and a Glimpse Ahead (May 13, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/private-
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part of the overall private equity marketplace.148 Just like fee discounts, when a 
large investor negotiates to receive a greater allocation of co-investment 
opportunities on better terms, it will enjoy the full benefit of that negotiation. 
3. Other Rights in Side Letters 
Fee discounts and co-investment rights are not the only individualized 
terms granted to investors in side letters. For example, as noted above, 
investors can negotiate for most favored nation rights in side letters, which 
effectively give an investor the benefit of any bargains made by other investors 
that have made similarly sized (or smaller) investments in the fund.149 This can 
be an extremely valuable individualized benefit. 
Investors can also seek to obtain seats on the fund’s advisory board. With 
a seat on the advisory board, an investor gains increased exposure to the fund 
manager and its operations,150 and it will have a right to vote if the manager 
seeks the advisory board’s consent to certain conflicted transactions. 
Importantly, when advisory board members participate in such votes, they 
typically have no duties to other investors in the fund and are free to vote in a 
manner that promotes their self-interest.151 
Side letters also commonly grant rights to address investors’ specialized 
disclosure or tax needs due to their structural and/or regulatory requirements 
(such as laws applicable to pension plans or sovereign wealth funds, among 
various others), and grant opt-out rights for investments in certain restricted 
industries.152 Investors also sometimes negotiate for things like customized 
 
equity-look-back-and-glimpse-ahead.html [https://perma.cc/Y8NV-EC2M] (observing that the 
allocation of co-investment rights “was becoming a key part of an investor’s thesis in allocating to a 
particular private equity fund”). 
148. See BAIN & CO., GLOBAL PRIVATE EQUITY REPORT 63 (2017), 
https://www.bain.com/contentassets/70fbce086b8142c2aeb1305ec8f09900/bain_report_global_private_
equity_report_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/EL74-TF5N] (“Bain estimates that coinvestment (the largest 
form of shadow capital) represents 10% to 12% of traditional fund-raising . . . .”); PREQIN, supra note 7, 
at 54 (reporting survey results showing that 64% of fund managers offered co-investments in 2017, up 
from 45% in 2014 and 52% in 2015, and that 42% of all surveyed private equity investors are actively 
co-investing, with 12% considering co-investing in the future); Cambridge Associates, Ready, Steady, 
Co-Invest (Mar. 2019), https://www.cambridgeassociates.com/research/co-investment-framework/ 
(estimating that co-investments composed approximately 20% of all private equity activity in 2017). 
149. See supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
150. See Claire Wilson, The Power of the LPAC, PRIV. FUNDS CFO (Dec. 15, 2017), 
https://www.privatefundscfo.com/print-editions/december-2017-january-2018-issue/the-power-of-the-
lpac/ [https://perma.cc/2YLM-9EY3] (“For the investor, membership [in an advisory board] is a way of 
gaining greater visibility into the fund’s operations and access to information that is not otherwise 
disclosed to investors.”). 
151. See CLAUDIA ZEISBERGER, MICHAEL PRAHL & BOWEN WHITE, MASTERING PRIVATE 
EQUITY: TRANSFORMATION VIA VENTURE CAPITAL, MINORITY INVESTMENTS AND BUYOUTS 215 
(2017) (“A fund’s limited partner advisory committee generally does not owe a fiduciary duty to the 
fund or its limited partners.”). 
152. See DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON, PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS: KEY BUSINESS, LEGAL AND TAX 
ISSUES 23, (2015), https://www.debevoise.com/~/media/files/insights/news/2015/pe_fundskey% 
20business_legal_tax_issues.pdf [https://perma.cc/2VGR-74WC]. 
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disclosure and special access to the manager in the form of informational 
meetings. 
These other rights can similarly have the effect of diluting a large 
investor’s incentive to negotiate LPA terms. 
4. Separately Managed Accounts 
An even more extreme type of individualized benefit occurs when a large 
investor negotiates for a “separately managed account” that exists entirely 
outside of a manager’s pooled funds. Unlike a co-investment opportunity, 
which is tied to a specific deal, separately managed accounts are vehicles that 
are set up to make many investments over longer periods of time. The terms of 
a separately managed account are independently negotiated between the 
investor and manager.153 
Separately managed accounts commonly have their own customized 
investment mandates, governance terms, and liquidity terms. Because the 
vehicle is not shared with other investors, it is easier for the investor to 
customize and exercise control over a separately managed account. Managers 
face competitive pressure to grant separately managed accounts to large 
investors who desire them,154 and, like co-investments, they are a large and 
growing part of the private equity marketplace,155 with no signs of slowing 
down.156 
Unlike fee discounts and co-investments, which merely diminish large 
investors’ incentive to negotiate for pooled fund contractual protections, 
separately managed accounts remove large investors from pooled funds 
altogether. This eliminates the possibility of that investor negotiating the terms 
of the pooled fund’s LPA because the separately managed account will be 
entirely separate from the pooled fund. 
 
153. Separately managed accounts can be used by investors to gain exposure to the various 
investment strategies offered by a manager—including, for example, hedge fund, real estate, and credit 
products—without having to invest directly in the various funds managed by the manager. 
154. See Anand Damodaran, Matthew Judd & James Board, Combining Managed Accounts 
with Traditional Fundraising: The Key Issues, PRIV. EQUITY INT’L 26 (Apr. 2013), 
https://www.ropesgray.com/~/media/Files/articles/2013/03/20130326_PEI.ashx [https://perma.cc/C7Y4-
KAMS] (“Recently, several sophisticated large-ticket investors, ranging from sovereign wealth funds to 
pension funds, have developed enhanced requirements for the terms under which they are willing to 
commit their sizable capital.”). 
155. See BAIN & CO., supra note 148, at 8 (“[S]eparately managed accounts now comprise 
almost 6% of private capital raised, up from 2.5% in 2006); Bowden, supra note 82 (“[M]uch of the 
growth in private equity is not coming from the traditional co-mingled vehicles but from separate 
accounts and side-by-side co-investments.”). 
156. See PREQIN, INVESTOR OUTLOOK: PRIVATE EQUITY H1, at 13 fig.2.10 (2016), 
https://docs.preqin.com/reports/Preqin-Investor-Outlook-Alternative-Assets-H1-2016.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/T7DB-UND9] (reporting the results of a survey showing that, among investors who 
had previously awarded a separate account mandate, 47% viewed separate account mandates as a 
permanent part of their investment strategy and 37% were considering making separate account 
mandates an ongoing part of their strategies going forward). 
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IV. Policy Implications 
The private equity negotiation myth reflects an effort by the industry to 
use a process-based argument to avoid substantive scrutiny.157 This Article, at 
its most basic level, aims to discourage policymakers and other industry 
observers from simply taking the myth at face value. It argues that just because 
there are large investors in the industry that have bargaining power, it cannot 
automatically be assumed that fund agreements will always have robust 
protections for all investors.158 
This Article also makes important contributions to broader policy debates 
at both the state and federal levels. Scholars and policymakers have been re-
evaluating conventional approaches to regulating private markets in recent 
years, driven in large part by the ongoing decline of the public corporation159 
and the unprecedented rise of private markets.160 Below, I discuss how a more 
accurate understanding of the effects of bargaining power in private equity 
funds changes these policy discussions. 
A. State Law: Waiving Fiduciary Duties in Limited Partnerships 
As noted above, private equity funds typically operate as limited 
partnerships.161 General partners have default fiduciary duties to the limited 
partners in a limited partnership,162 but in most states these duties can be 
modified by written agreement in the LPA. In some states, including Delaware, 
 
157. See supra Section II.B. 
158. This does not reflect a judgment about whether the substantive terms of LPAs are 
actually fair or not. See supra Section II.A for a summary of various critiques of the substance of LPA 
terms. Nor does it rule out the possibility that there might be other process-based arguments to support 
the idea that private equity LPAs are built on effective processes that lead to sound terms. 
159. See Xiaohui Gao et al., Where Have All the IPOs Gone?, 48 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE 
ANALYSIS 1663, 1663 (2013) (showing that from 2001-2012, there were an average of less than 100 
IPOs each year in the United States, compared to over 300 IPOs per year during the 1980s and 1990s); 
Why the Decline in the Number of Listed American Firms Matters, ECONOMIST (Apr. 22, 2017), 
https://www.economist.com/business/2017/04/22/why-the-decline-in-the-number-of-listed-american-
firms-matters [https://perma.cc/6LAG-GZNL] (“A big trend in American business is the collapse in the 
number of listed companies. There were 7,322 in 1996; today there are 3,671.”); Andrew Ross Sorkin, 
C.E.O.s Meet in Secret over the Sorry State of Public Companies, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/21/business/dealbook/ceos-meet-in-secret-over-sorry-state-of-public-
companies.html [https://perma.cc/767J-JU3R] (reporting the findings of the National Bureau of 
Research that the number of publicly listed companies dropped from 8,025 to 4,101 over approximately 
the last twenty years); Anne VanderMey, IPOs Are Dwindling, So Is the Number of Public Companies, 
FORTUNE (Jan. 20, 2017), https://fortune.com/2017/01/20/public-companies-ipo-financial-markets 
[https://perma.cc/DA73-GUTM] (reporting a 65% decline in the number of U.S. initial public offerings 
since 2014). 
160. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
161. Most state law views limited partnerships as highly contractual in nature and defers to the 
terms and conditions set forth in limited partnership agreements. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 
17.1101(c) (2018) (“It is the policy of this chapter to give maximum effect to the principle of freedom of 
contract and to the enforceability of partnership agreements.”). 
162. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
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they can be eliminated entirely.163 This contractarian approach has been the 
subject of much controversy, and a robust literature has developed on the 
desirability of fiduciary duty waivers in non-corporate entities.164 
One of the most important commentaries in this area in recent years was 
published by Leo Strine, former Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, 
and Travis Laster, Vice Chancellor of the Delaware Court of Chancery. Strine 
and Laster focused their analysis on the waiver of fiduciary duties in alternative 
entities, which include limited partnerships and limited liability companies.165 
Interestingly, Strine and Laster expressed the view that, based on the cases they 
have observed over the years in Delaware, alternative entity agreements appear 
to be more like standard form contracts than highly negotiated agreements.166 
They argued that alternative entity agreements are usually offered to investors 
on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, and that this approach can lead to these 
agreements having one-sided terms, including provisions that waive the 
fiduciary duties of the entity’s manager.167 This commentary, which struck at 
the heart of Delaware’s long-time commitment to complete freedom of contract 
in alternative entities, was remarkable, particularly given the authoritativeness 
of the authors. 
By sharing their perspective from the Delaware bench, Strine and Laster 
offered an extremely valuable view168 into the usually private world of 
 
163. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
164. See, e.g., Andrew S. Gold, On the Elimination of Fiduciary Duties: A Theory of Good 
Faith for Unincorporated Firms, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 123 (2006); Mohsen Manesh, Contractual 
Freedom Under Delaware Alternative Entity Law: Evidence from Publicly Traded LPs and LLCs, 37 J. 
CORP. L. 555 (2012); Sandra K. Miller & Karie Davis-Nozemack, Toward Consistent Fiduciary Duties 
for Publicly Traded Entities, 68 FLA. L. REV. 263 (2016); Peter Molk, How Do LLC Owners Contract 
Around Default Statutory Protections?, 42 J. CORP. L. 503 (2017); Peter Molk, Protecting LLC Owners 
While Preserving LLC Flexibility, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2129 (2018); Larry E. Ribstein, Partnership 
Governance of Large Firms, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 289 (2009); Ribstein, supra note 74. 
165. Strine & Laster, supra note 21. As previously discussed, private equity LPAs commonly 
contain provisions waiving the fiduciary duties of the fund’s general partner (which is usually an 
affiliate of the manager). 
166. See id. at 23 (“The record in actual cases rarely, if ever, reflects that any bargaining at all 
occurred over the governing instrument. Instead, it is almost always the case that the manager or general 
partner’s counsel drafted the governing instrument and investors were only given the choice to sign up 
or not, but not to bargain over its terms.”). 
167. See id. (“The cases . . . cast doubt on the idea that the liability standards in alternative 
entity governing instruments reflect a high-minded, careful consideration of the unusual role of the 
human beings who serve as fiduciaries of general partners and managing members. Nor do the cases 
suggest that these standards are the result of bargaining between entity managers who wish to limit their 
own liability and investors who want to be able to hold them and their human fiduciaries accountable.”). 
Some would argue that LPAs have become even more manager-friendly since Strine and Laster’s 
article. See Elizabeth Weindruch & Brian Pope, Views from the LPAC, BARINGS 4 (July 2019), 
https://www.barings.com/assets/user/media/07.2019_ViewsFromTheLPAC.pdf [https://perma.cc/E2UF-
43J5] (“As partnerships have become progressively sophisticated over time, the LPA terms have gotten 
more granular and nuanced—and there’s been a noticeable shift toward agreements that incorporate 
more favorable terms for the general partner.”). 
168. Strine and Laster’s analysis, of course, is limited by the fact that it was based on 
anecdotal observations. Strine & Laster, supra note 21, at 1 (“Based on the cases we have decided and 
our reading of many other cases decided by our judicial colleagues, we do not discern evidence of arms-
length bargaining between sponsors and investors in the governing instruments of alternative entities.”).  
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alternative entities.169 However, they left open two critical questions for private 
equity funds. First, Strine and Laster’s account suggests that the reason 
investors fail to negotiate the terms of alternative entity agreements is that they 
have inferior bargaining power. According to Strine and Laster, investors 
usually sign the agreement on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, and almost never get a 
chance to negotiate the terms, even if they want to.170 But this cannot always be 
true in private equity funds. Private equity managers—particularly those with 
low-performing track records—will not always have such superior bargaining 
power vis-à-vis their investors, and there will certainly be cycles when investor 
demand for private equity funds is on the wane. Why, then, do Strine and 
Laster indicate that the Delaware courts almost never see evidence that 
alternative entity agreements are negotiated by investors?171 
This Article helps to explain that puzzle in the private equity context. It 
shows why private equity LPAs may not be heavily negotiated even when 
managers have relatively weak bargaining power. When individualized benefits 
are available, investors can expect to receive more value by negotiating for 
individualized benefits before they negotiate for better LPA terms.172 Hence, 
regardless of how much bargaining power managers have, negotiating the LPA 
is likely to be a secondary priority when large investors can negotiate for 
individualized benefits. This is an important distinction. It shows that limited 
negotiation of LPAs is not just a temporary condition that persists only during 
cycles when managers have strong bargaining power, but something that can 
exist in all cycles. 
This insight fundamentally alters our understanding of the problem that 
Strine and Laster identify, as well as the range of policy responses that could 
address the problem in private equity funds. If we assume that the light 
negotiation of private equity fund LPAs is a consequence of managers’ 
bargaining power, then it would be logical to conclude that the concerns raised 
by Strine and Laster will simply be resolved when market conditions change 
and investors have more bargaining power relative to managers. But this may 
not be true. 
Second, while Strine and Laster are clear about their opinion that 
alternative entity agreements are not highly negotiated, they fail to explain why 
the absence of negotiation is a problem. As discussed above, optimal contracts 
 
169. See Mohsen Manesh, Dictum in Alternative Entity Jurisprudence and the Expansion of 
Judicial Power in Delaware, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PARTNERSHIPS, LLCS AND ALTERNATIVE 
FORMS OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 346 (Robert W. Hillman & Mark J. Loewenstein eds., 2015) 
(“The vast majority of alternative entity businesses are private, rather than publicly traded.”).  
170. Strine & Laster, supra note 21, at 23 (“The record in actual cases rarely, if ever, reflects 
that any bargaining at all occurred over the governing instrument. Instead, it is almost always the case 
that the manager or general partner’s counsel drafted the governing instrument and investors were only 
given the choice to sign up or not, but not to bargain over its terms. . . . [T]he practical alternatives for a 
skeptical investor are often stark: invest without adequate protection against self-dealing or avoid the 
asset class altogether.”); see supra note 166. 
171. Strine & Laster, supra note 21, at 23. 
172. See supra Sections III.A.2 and III.A.3. 
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can be created without any negotiation in a competitive market.173 Without 
negotiation, private equity investors could choose to “vote with their feet” by 
avoiding funds that waive fiduciary duties, thereby putting competitive pressure 
on managers not to do so. 
In this Article, I show why we cannot assume that large investors will 
always exert this kind of nonbargaining pressure on managers. I show that large 
investors may sometimes be willing to look the other way and invest in funds 
that have less robust protections when they can negotiate for individualized 
benefits. The sophistication level of other investors in the market—those that 
lack bargaining power—is therefore also an important consideration. 
Another way of stating this idea is simply to say that large investors with 
bargaining power may not always be the marginal investors in the funds they 
invest in. This question of who the marginal investors are is a critical one. If the 
marginal investors are capable of evaluating LPA terms and searching the 
market for alternatives,174 then concerns in the literature about suboptimal LPA 
terms may be overstated. But if they are not, then the logic for restricting the 
ability to waive fiduciary standards in private equity funds would be stronger. 
Strine and Laster’s article made important contributions to the current 
dialogue on the waiver of fiduciary duties in non-corporate entities. But their 
commentary offered an overly narrow explanation for why private equity 
LPAs, specifically, are lightly negotiated (by assuming it is caused by 
imbalances in bargaining power) and also failed to address the role of 
individualized benefits in making large investors less sensitive to private equity 
LPA terms. By filling in these gaps, this Article clarifies both the nature and 
scope of the problem in the context of private equity funds. 
B. Federal Law: Regulating Access to Private Funds 
Federal law regulates who can and cannot invest in private entities.175 In 
an effort to strike an appropriate balance between investor protection and 
access to capital markets, policymakers have engaged in various initiatives over 
the years to update the rules regulating who can and cannot invest in private 
entities, sometimes in contradictory ways.176 On one hand, in the interest of 
 
173. See supra Section III.B.1. 
174. See supra note 126 and accompanying text. 
175. See supra note 104. 
176. The academic literature in this area is also mixed. Some scholars have argued that 
expanding private fund access to a broader universe of investors would be socially beneficial because, 
among other reasons, it would give ordinary investors the tax advantages of investing in a private fund 
and because lower regulatory restrictions could generate better expected returns. See, e.g., Samuel 
Brunson, Mutual Funds, Fairness, and the Income Gap, 65 ALA. L. REV. 139 (2013); John C. Coates 
IV, Reforming the Taxation and Regulation of Mutual Funds: A Comprehensive Legal and Economic 
Analysis, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 591 (2008); Cary Martin Shelby, Privileged Access to Financial 
Innovation, 47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 315, 317 (2015) (“Retail investors are mainly stuck with mutual funds, 
which is an industry that is plagued with severe regulatory constraints placed on the strategies of such 
funds.”). Other scholars have criticized the existing standards, arguing that they leave room for 
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promoting investor protection, the SEC has increased various net worth 
requirements for participating in private markets.177 Yet, in the interest of 
making it easier to raise capital, Congress has also made it easier for private 
entities to solicit capital from a broader range of investors and authorized new 
channels for private investment that impose no investor sophistication 
standards.178 
In June 2019, the SEC issued a concept release that appears to be one of 
the most ambitious and comprehensive re-examinations of the securities law 
exemptions in decades.179 This release, which is over 200 pages long, shows 
that the SEC is considering fundamental changes in the law to simplify, 
harmonize, and improve the securities offering framework. Central to this effort 
is a desire by the SEC—one that has been vocalized by Jay Clayton multiple 
times during his tenure as chairman of the SEC180—to give ordinary investors 
 
opportunism against unsophisticated investors. See, e.g., Abraham J.B. Cable, Mad Money: Rethinking 
Private Placements, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2253, 2256-57 (proposing a re-configuration of the 
private placement regime because the existing rules “leave wealthy but unsophisticated investors 
unprotected”); Howard M. Friedman, On Being Rich, Accredited, and Undiversified, 47 OKLA. L. REV. 
291, 299 (1994) (suggesting that the accredited-investor standard leaves wealthy but unsophisticated 
investors vulnerable); Jennifer Johnson, Private Placements: A Regulatory Blackhole, 35 DEL. J. CORP. 
L. 151, 191-92 nn.242-43 (2010) (arguing that “there is also a growing recognition that the accredited-
investor standard provides insufficient protection for investors”); William K. Sjostrom, Jr., Rebalancing 
Private Placement Regulation, 36 SEATTLE UNIV. L. REV. 1143, 1143 (2013) (arguing that recent 
updates to the securities laws “has tilted the balance too far in favor of capital formation and away from 
investor protection”); Allen Ferrell & John Morley, New Special Study of the Securities Markets: 
Institutional Intermediaries 33 (Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 580, 2017), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3005542 (“[T]here are tremendous tax advantages to remaining private. The 
taxation of registered investment companies in the United States is almost always less favorable than the 
taxation of private funds, for both investors and managers.”). 
177. See Net Worth Standard for Accredited Investors, Securities Act Release No. 9,287, 
Investment Advisers Act No. 3,341, Investment Company Act No. 29,891, 77 Fed. Reg. 18684 (Dec. 21, 
2011) (updating the definition of “accredited investor” so that the value of an investor’s principle 
residence cannot be taken into consideration when determining whether the investor meets the $1 
million net worth threshold); Order Approving Adjustment for Inflation of the Dollar Amount Tests in 
Rule 205-3 Under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4,421, 81 
Fed. Reg. 39985 (June 14, 2016) (increasing the net worth requirement for the “qualified client” 
standard from $2 million to $2.1 million). Under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act, the SEC is required to review the definition of “accredited investor,” one of the central 
standards for determining eligibility to invest in private vehicles, every four years and make updates as it 
deems appropriate. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 413(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1577 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77b note (2018)); SEC, REPORT ON THE 
REVIEW OF THE DEFINITION OF “ACCREDITED INVESTOR” (Dec. 18, 2015), 
https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/reportspubs/special-studies/review-definition-of-accredited-investor-12-18-
2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z264-J6NW].  
178. See Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, tit. III, 126 Stat. 306, 315 
(2012) (authorizing companies to engage in equity-based “crowdfunding” without having to satisfy any 
investor sophistication requirements). The final “crowdfunding” rule was finalized by the SEC in 2015. 
See Crowdfunding, Securities Act Release No. 9,974, Exchange Act Release No. 76,324, 80 Fed. Reg. 
71388 (Nov. 16, 2015). 
179. See supra note 23. 
180. See, e.g., Dave Michaels, SEC Chairman Wants to Let More Main Street Investors in on 
Private Deals, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 30, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-chairman-wants-to-let-
more-main-street-investors-in-on-private-deals-1535648208 [https://perma.cc/SEH2-P63G] (“Mr. 
Clayton said the SEC is now weighing a major overhaul of rules intended to protect mom-and-pop 
investors, with the goal of opening up new options for them.”); Jay Clayton, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & 
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expanded access to private investment opportunities. The SEC’s June 2019 
release specifically contemplates potential changes that would give ordinary 
investors greater access to private fund investments. In December 2019, the 
SEC took one step in this direction by proposing to update the accredited 
investor definition in a manner that would allow more investors to fall within 
exemptions to the Securities Act of 1933 registration requirements, including 
by leaving income and wealth requirements unadjusted for inflation.181  
The SEC’s sentiment appears to be generally consistent with a report 
issued in November 2018 by the Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, an 
influential nonpartisan research group formed by Henry Paulson in 2006.182 In 
that report, the Committee on Capital Markets Regulation recommends 
expanding investor access to private equity funds in three ways: through 
legislative reforms to expand access to direct investments in private equity 
funds; through reforms to expand access to registered mutual funds that invest 
in private equity funds; and through reforms to make it easier for 401(k) plans 
to invest in private equity funds.183 The Committee on Capital Markets 
Regulation encourages implementing these changes on a timely basis so retail 
investors can enjoy access to private equity investment as quickly as 
possible.184 
In the November 2018 report, the Committee on Capital Markets 
Regulation makes an important assumption about how unsophisticated 
investors will interact with large investors in private equity funds. To address 
concerns about investor safety, it suggests that if retail investors were to invest 
alongside large institutional investors, they would be able to free ride on the 
protections that those institutional investors demand, regardless of whether 
their investment takes the form of a direct investment,185 a registered mutual 
 
Exch. Comm’n, Remarks on Capital Formation at the Nashville 36|86 Entrepreneurship Festival (Aug. 
29, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-clayton-082918 [https://perma.cc/8UES-4CME]. 
181. See SEC, Proposed Rule Amending the “Accredited Investor” Definition (Dec. 18, 2019), 
https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2019/33-10734.pdf [https://perma.cc/95AD-XEYE].  
182. See COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, supra note 25. 
183. See id. at 1 (“We find that private equity funds have a well-established performance 
history that justifies expanding investor access to them. We recommend three ways to do so. First, 
legislative reforms to expand access to direct investments in private equity funds. Second, SEC reforms 
to expand access to public closed-end funds that invest in private equity funds. And finally, Department 
of Labor reforms to facilitate the ability of 401(k) plans to invest in private equity funds.”). 
184. See id. at 69 (“[A[lthough our first recommendation would require legislative action, the 
SEC and the DOL could implement each of our other recommendations through regulatory reforms. We 
encourage them to do so on a timely basis, as retail investors are missing out on the returns and safety 
that private equity funds, and the private companies in which they invest, can offer a well-balanced 
portfolio.”). 
185. See id. at 36 (“Congress could establish or empower the SEC to establish any . . . 
protections for retail investors that they deem necessary. For example, . . . Congress or the SEC could 
only permit a private equity fund to accept retail investors if the assets managed by the affiliated 
manager include a material institutional component (e.g., more than 50%). Such a requirement would 
enable retail investors to leverage the demands of institutional investors.”). 
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fund,186 or a 401(k) investment.187 This assumption seems to take at face value 
the private equity negotiation myth—the idea that large investors in private 
equity funds can be relied on to demand strong protections for the other 
investors in a fund.188 
This Article’s analysis shows why policymakers should be skeptical of 
this claim. For the reasons outlined above, because large investors can 
negotiate for individualized benefits in these funds, the sophistication level of 
the other investors in the fund—those that do not have bargaining power—
matters.189 
V. Conclusion 
The private equity industry has repeatedly invoked the private equity 
negotiation myth to defend against substantive critiques of fund agreements 
over the years. This myth assumes that large investors will use their bargaining 
power to demand strong fund agreement protections for all investors in a fund, 
but policymakers cannot simply assume that this will be true. This Article 
offers a more realistic portrayal of the complicated role that bargaining power 
plays in private equity funds. In light of active debates about the rules 
governing who can participate in private equity funds and how they should be 
operated, the need for sound theory—and not mythologies promulgated by the 
industry—in this area has never been stronger. 
 
186. See id. at 42 (“To the extent additional protections for retail investors were deemed 
appropriate, we note that the SEC could adopt such protections by simply restricting the private equity 
funds that public closed-end funds could invest in. For example, the SEC could only allow public 
closed-end funds to invest in private equity funds . . . where the assets managed by the affiliated 
manager include a material institutional component (e.g., more than 50%).”). 
187. See id. at 67-68 (“The investment committee should only invest in private equity funds 
where . . . at least a majority of [its] assets were managed on behalf of third party investors (other than 
defined contribution plans) that are qualified institutional buyers within the meaning of Rule 144A as 
promulgated under Securities Exchange Act of 1933, as amended.”). 
188. The November 2018 report does not discuss giving retail investors a most favored nation 
right or other feature that would entitle them to receive benefits granted to other investors. 
189. In addition to concerns about manager self-dealing, retail investors would also need to be 
concerned about managers transferring value to larger investors. In an earlier article, I discussed factors 
that dis-incentivize managers from transferring too much value from pooled funds to separately 
managed accounts and co-investment vehicles. See William Clayton, Preferential Treatment and the 
Rise of Individualized Investing, 11 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 249 (2017). Nearly all of those factors, 
however, rely on smaller investors being capable of analyzing complex disclosures and making 
informed investment decisions—an assumption that is less likely to be true of retail investors. 
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Appendix B. Illustrative Co-Investment Arrangement (arrows pointing directly 
at portfolio companies denote co-investments) 
 
 
 
 
